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THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS—THE NEED TO REVISIT THE NCAA’S 
“NO AGENT RULE” 
John P. Sahl* 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the primary 
governing body for intercollegiate athletics, promulgated its “No Agent 
Rule” in 1974 prohibiting advisors of student-athletes from communi-
cating and negotiating with professional sports teams.  As part of a core 
principle of amateurism, the NCAA adopted this rule, in part, to deline-
ate between professional athletes and student athletes.  However, 
through economic and societal evolution, this policy is antiquated and 
detrimental to the personal and professional development of college ath-
letes. 
This Article argues in favor of expanding the recent Rice Commis-
sion’s recommendation, adopted by the NCAA, to grant an exception 
from the No Agent Rule for Men’s Division I elite basketball players to 
all college sports and levels of competition.  The NCAA’s landscape for 
governing college athletics has undergone many recent changes, some 
of which strengthen the notion that all student-athletes would benefit 
from earlier access to agent advice and assistance.  The Changing Land-
scape of Intercollegiate Athletics—The Need to Revisit the NCAA’s “No 
Agent Rule” discusses this need by first detailing the evolution of NCAA 
governance, followed by an analysis of the Gatto decision and its impact 
on the Rice Commission’s report promoting an exception to the No Agent 
Rule for Division I Men’s elite basketball players. 
Finally, this article recommends that because of the changed and 
ever-evolving landscape of college sports, the NCAA should abandon its 
No Agent Rule in favor of a Modified Agent Rule (MAR).  The MAR 
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would enable all student-athletes to contract with sports agents subject 
to some NCAA oversight to protect student-athletes from agent abuse 
and to support the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism.  The MAR prom-
ises to alleviate some of the stress and challenges that hinder all student-
athletes, especially gifted athletes, when assessing how and by what 
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The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has long 
governed amateur collegiate athletics like a watchful overlord, relying 
on a maze of byzantine-like rules to promote, in large part, its institu-
tional self-interests.1  These rules have enabled the NCAA to wield broad 
 
 1. GERALD GURNEY, DONNA A. LOPIANO & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNWINDING 
MADNESS: WHAT WENT WRONG WITH COLLEGE SPORTS AND HOW TO FIX IT 16 (2017) 
[hereinafter GURNEY] (describing the maze of byzantine-like rules in the NCAA Manual as 
being over “a thousand pages long, [with an extensive] list of quixotic regulations that purport 
to uphold amateurism . . . .”); see John P. Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: 
What’s Left After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. 
Ct. 454 (1988)?, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621, 624 (1989) (describing the NCAA as the “overlord of 
college sports”); see also id. at 622 (contending, contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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authority over its members to enforce rule compliance.  The end result 
of NCAA’s rules and broad authority is clear—the NCAA remains the 
leading force in college athletics with university presidents, the public, 
and others seeking its imprimatur.2 
The steady stream of news reports about college sports and the 
NCAA highlights their importance in our nation’s daily affairs.3  The 
public has a seemingly insatiable appetite for information and stories 
about athletics, including NCAA athletics.4  This appetite is fueled by 
24/7 sports coverage in a wide variety of outlets and platforms.5  Some 
of the stories are positive, for example, when a collegiate championship 
 
Tarkanian, that “college students should be entitled to constitutional due process before being 
deprived of their athletic eligibility”). 
 2. One example of “others” seeking NCAA approval would include commercial ven-
dors, like Nike and Coca-Cola, who provide products to coaches, athletes, and fans. The 
NCAA’s broad authority may have diminished slightly over the last half-century. See Taylor 
Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 2011), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/. Students of 
NCAA history can point to different benchmarks to show this gradual erosion of unbridled 
authority. Certainly, one key development in this erosion occurred in 1984 when the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma Board of Regents successfully challenged the NCAA’s rules limiting the 
televising of college football games on antitrust grounds. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119-20 (1984). The case undermined the NCAA’s absolute con-
trol over college football, a key source of revenue, and signaled to many that the NCAA’s 
power was not absolute, foreshadowing further lawsuits to curtail at least perceived NCAA 
abuses of power. One such lawsuit was NCAA v. Miller, in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
the Nevada law violated the dormant commerce clause by unduly burdening interstate com-
merce by requiring NCAA members to provide student athletes with certain due process pro-
tections. 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 3. See, e.g., NCAA presidents set revised financial distribution to support college ath-
letes, NCAA (Mar. 26, 2020, 1:23 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-cen-
ter/news/ncaa-presidents-set-revised-financial-distribution-support-college-athletes; see also, 
e.g., Ryan Lewis, Indians announce plans to extend protective Netting at Progressive Field 
for 2020 season, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 29, 2020, 11:51 AM), https://www.beaconjour-
nal.com/sports/20200129/indians-announce-plans-to-extend-protective-netting—progres-
sive-field-for-2020-season (reporting all thirty teams in Major League Baseball will be ex-
tending netting after several serious incidents of fans being injured by foul balls); The Jim 
Rome Show (CBS Sports Radio 2020) (providing biweekly sports radio talk including sixty-
second commentaries on the day’s top sports headlines). 
 4. See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 9 (2000) 
[hereinafter Smith] (underscoring the public’s interest in sports, one expert referred to sport 
as “the religion of the American people” and noted “[a]s a people, we seem almost fixated on 
sport and devote much space in newspapers and newscasts to sport, with little space being 
allocated to religion”). 
 5. See, e.g., ESPN: COLLEGE FOOTBALL NATION BLOG, 
https://www.espn.com/blog/ncfnation (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); see also, e.g., BLEACHER 
REP., https://bleacherreport.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); see also, e.g., 247 SPORTS, 
https://247sports.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
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sports team is invited to meet with the President of the United States6 at 
the White House or when a university’s team engages in charitable ac-
tivities.7 
Some of the stories are negative and cause a public stir.8  For ex-
ample, a recent investigation found that “college athletes punished for 
sexual assault routinely transfer and keep playing in the NCAA.”9  This 
is unsettling news, especially given the #MeToo Movement and other 
recent efforts to raise national awareness about the significance of sexual 
assaults against the backdrop of high-profile sexual assault cases 
 
 6. The 2020 NCAA Division I football champions, Louisiana State University Tigers, 
visited with President Trump at the White House. Trump honors national champion LSU Ti-
gers at the White House, CBS NEWS (Jan. 17, 2020, 4:47 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lsu-tigers-college-football-national-champions-visit-white-
house-today-2020-01-17/. 
 7. See, e.g., WKYC Staff, ‘We Roar with Emma’: Akron Zips hold Saturday basketball 
doubleheader to benefit Norton teen, WKYC STUDIOS (Jan. 17, 2020, 7:52 PM), 
https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/local/summit-county/we-roar-with-emma-akron-zips-
saturday-basketball-doubleheader-to-benefit-norton-teen/95-94eb0df8-ea73-4098-b0d0-
04d74f734e56 (explaining that the proceeds of a basketball game between the University of 
Akron Zips and the University of Toledo Rockets were donated to help a local athlete at 
Wadsworth High School who was recovering from injuries and a coma). Of course, profes-
sional sports teams and figures also attract positive coverage for similar publicly spirited 
work. See Cleveland Cavaliers, Cavs Players Serve Thanksgiving Dinner to Local Families, 
NBA (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nba.com/cavaliers/community/thanksgiving-dinner-
181120; John Pana, Cleveland Cavaliers players, coaches, serve Thanksgiving dinner to 
young students (video), CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cleve-
land.com/cavs/2017/11/cavs_players_and_coaches_serve.html; see also Marla Ridenour, 
Three-point bonus: Cavaliers’ Cedi Osman, Larry Nance Jr. donate $10,000 for Turkey earth-
quake relief, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 26, 2020, 6:06 PM), https://www.beaconjour-
nal.com/sports/20200126/three-point-bonus-cavaliersrsquo-cedi-osman-larry-nance-jr-do-
nate-10000-for-turkey-earthquake-relief. News of a terrible earthquake in Turkey prompted 
Cedi Osman, who plays for the Turkish National Team, and Larry Nance of the Cleveland 
Cavaliers to donate $100 and $200 respectively for each successful three-point shot made by 
the Cavaliers in a game against the Chicago Bulls on January 25, 2020. Id. The donations 
were to help with the relief effort in Turkey. Id. 
 8. Although this article focuses on the NCAA, college athletics, and the NCAA’s reg-
ulation of agents, professional athletics also generates both positive and negative stories. For 
example, the cheating scandal involving baseball and the Houston Astros attracted national 
attention, shocking many fans and others. See Astros fire manager, GM after suspensions for 
sign-stealing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 13, 2020), https://ap-
news.com/a35c982320cd4a4986aef75727957c5c; see also Ryan Lewis, Figuring out signs 
has its place in baseball, but Astros committed theft, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 13, 2020, 5:09 
PM), https://www.beaconjournal.com/sports/20200113/ryan-lewis-figuring-out-signs-has-
its-place-in-baseball-but-astros-committed-theft. 
 9. Kenny Jacoby, NCAA president deflects blame on sexual assault policy, USA TODAY 
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involving Bill Cosby,10 Harvey Weinstein,11 and Jeffery Epstein.12  In 
response to news about such controversial transfers, the NCAA Presi-
dent, Mark Emmert, said the schools admitting these transfers bear re-
sponsibility for this situation, while some university leaders instead point 
the finger of responsibility at the NCAA.13  The NCAA’s refusal to ac-
cept any responsibility for these transfers or to outline a course of action 
to address this problem is problematic.  The NCAA missed an oppor-
tunity to take a leadership role on an important social issue and to high-
light its concern for student safety. 
One important takeaway from some of these stories about the 
NCAA and intercollege athletics is that the current NCAA landscape for 
governing intercollegiate athletics is significantly changing, buffeted by 
tsunami-like challenges to its authority and business model.14  One 
 
 10. Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2019); see 
Maryclaire Dale, Bill Cosby sex assault verdict upheld; spokesman lashes out, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/2f4b9e6b0da6980411b4f3080434d21b. 
 11. See Chris Francescani & Alexandra Svokos, Harvey Weinstein found guilty on 2 
counts in sexual assault case, ABC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2020, 12:09 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/jury-reaches-verdict-harvey-weinstein-
case/story?id=69175544; see also Chris Francescani & Aaron Katersky, Harvey Weinstein 
sentenced to 23 Years on sex crime convictions, ABC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020, 9:29 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/harvey-weinstein-despondent-faces-sentencing-
york/story?id=69516249. 
 12. United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see Christina 
Carrega, Stephanie Wash & Bill Hutchinson, Millionaire Jeffrey Epstein’s sex-trafficking trial 
set for next year; a million pages of discovery expected, ABC NEWS (July 31, 2019, 2:24 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/millionaire-jeffrey-epsteins-sex-trafficking-trial-set-
year/story?id=64678798. 
 13. Jacoby, supra note 9. 
 14. The Rice Commission noted that the more serious and confounding challenges to 
NCAA authority and its business model are the “legal challenges to its amateurism rule under 
antitrust and employment theories” (citing, in part In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Anti-
trust Litigation, Case No. 4:14-md-2541-CW (N.D. CA 2014)) (“[C]hallenging the failure to 
pay Division I Men’s and Women’s Basketball and FBS football players the difference in the 
value of an athletic scholarship and the full cost of attendance”); Jenkins v. NCAA, Civil 
Action 12-CV-3:33-av-0001 (D.N.J. 2014) (“[C]hallenging agreement not to compete for ser-
vices of Division I Men’s and FBS players as a violation of the antitrust laws without legiti-
mate pro-competitive purposes . . . .”). COMM’N ON COLL. BASKETBALL, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 22 n.17 
(2018) [hereinafter RICE COMMISSION or RICE REPORT]; see also Nw. Univ. & College Ath-
letes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1368 (Aug. 17, 2015) (challenging the NCAA’s am-
ateurism rule and business model under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) when stu-
dent-athletes sought union certification and ultimately deciding that NU football players who 
received grant-in-aid scholarships were employees under NLRA § 2(3)). The Regional Direc-
tor of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rejected NU’s argument that they were 
“primarily students” because, in part, scholarship players spend more time per-week on foot-
ball-related activities than school-related activities and are subject to strict control all year. 
The full NLRB vacated the regional director’s ruling “without deciding whether the scholar-
ship players are statutory employees under Section 2(3).” Id. at 1355. Instead, the Board 
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important example of such change was the court’s 2013 decision in 
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.15 
Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball star, and a group of cur-
rent and former college football and men’s basketball players filed an 
antitrust class action in 2013 against the NCAA.16  They alleged that 
NCAA rules prohibiting athletes from making money from their name, 
image, and likeness (NIL) violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.17  The 
district court ruled the NCAA’s no compensation rules were an “unlaw-
ful restraint of trade”—marking the first time a federal court found that 
NCAA’s amateurism rules violated antitrust laws.18 
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge’s deci-
sion in O’Bannon that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust review, 
but vacated the “judgement and injunction insofar as they require[d] the 
NCAA to allow its member schools to pay student-athletes up to $5,000 
per year in deferred [NIL] compensation.”19  The court believed paying 
 
declined to assert jurisdiction in this case because it would “not effectuate the policies of the 
[NLRA] . . .”  in promoting uniformity and stability in labor relations, given the “nature of 
league sports and the NCAA’s oversight [that] renders individual team bargaining problem-
atic. . . .” Id. at 1352-54. The NLRB’s decision to sidestep the important question of whether 
scholarship players are employees raises the ominous specter for the NCAA that student ath-
letes should have more of a voice in college sports, including earning compensation. At the 
very least, the NLRB’s pass on the important question of whether college athletes are employ-
ees added new impetus to the school of thought that student athletes are employees and enti-
tled to greater legal protection and economic rewards. See generally Michael Pego, The De-
lusion of Amateurism in College Sports: Why Scholarship Student Athletes Are Destined to 
Be Considered “Employees” Under the NLRA, 13 FIU L. REV. 277 (2018). 
 15. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 16. Id. at 1055-56. O’Bannon “visited a friend’s house, where his friend’s son told 
O’Bannon that he was depicted in a college video game produced by Electronics Arts (EA), 
a software company, that produced video games based on college football and men’s basket-
ball games from late 1990s to around 2013.” 
 17. Id. at 1049, 1052; see also The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) 
(Trusts, etc., In Restraint of Trade Illegal; Penalty). The NCAA’s rules barring compensation 
for NIL are subject to antitrust laws because amateurism rules are not categorically valid, 
involve commercial activity in which student-athletes anticipate compensation, and have an 
anti-competitive effect on the college market. 
 18. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1052-53. Senior District Court Judge Claudia Wilkens con-
ducted a bench trial and ruled that the NCAA’s amateurism rules prohibiting NILs compen-
sation constituted an unlawful restraint of trade and issued an injunction that the NCAA 
change its practices. To review Judge Wilkens’ thoughtful decision, see O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (affirmed in part, vacated in part by O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
 19. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. The NCAA bylaws define a student-athlete as  
a student whose enrollment was solicited by a member of the athletic staff or other 
representative of athletics interests with a view toward the student’s ultimate par-
ticipation in the intercollegiate athletics program. Any other student becomes a stu-
dent-athlete only when the student reports for an intercollegiate squad that is under 
the jurisdiction of the athletics department, as specified in the Constitution. 3.2.4.6. 
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“cash sums untethered to educational expenses” destroyed any pretense 
of amateurism and threatened the very existence of NCAA amateur ath-
letics.20  Perhaps more importantly, the same court affirmed the trial 
court’s injunction requiring the NCAA to permit its members to raise the 
grant-in-aid or scholarship cap to cover the full cost of attendance.21  The 
O’Bannon decision heralded a new era of compensation for student-ath-
letes, entitling them to a share of the NIL revenue based on their athletic 
 
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 DIVISION I MANUAL, ART. 12, § 
12.02.14 at 62 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]; see Chuck Provencio, Student-Ath-
lete: A Study of Student-Athlete Workload Compared with Traditional Student Work-
load (2016) (thesis, Paper No. 1054, South Dakota State University), https://openprai-
rie.sdstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2053&context=etd (noting a study that 
defines a student-athlete as someone who receives a scholarship in exchange for athletic 
participation; this definition excludes the population of “walk-ons” or student-athletes 
without scholarship). 
 20. “Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and 
no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078. The appellate majority  
found . . . there is a concrete procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment to 
amateurism: namely that the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their ap-
peal to consumers. We therefore conclude that the NCAA’s compensation rules 
serve two procompetitive purposes identified by the district court: integrating aca-
demics with athletics, and ‘preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product by 
promoting its current understanding of amateurism.’  
Id. at 1073. However, the dissent agreed with the District Court and noted,  
[t]he national debate about amateurism in college sports is important. But our task 
as appellate judges is not to resolve it . . . . Our task is simply to review the district 
court judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust law and under the appropri-
ate standard of review. In the end, my disagreement with the majority is founded on 
the appropriate standard of review. After an extensive bench trial, the district court 
made a factual finding that payment of $5,000 in deferred compensation would not 
significantly reduce consumer demand for college sports. 
Id. at 1083 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 1075, 1079. “A compensation cap set at student-athletes’ full cost of attendance 
is a substantially less restrictive alternative means of accomplishing the NCAA’s legitimate 
procompetitive purposes.” Id. at 1075. The NCAA defines COA as the “amount calculated by 
an institutional financial aid office, using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of 
tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses 
[“e.g., . . . childcare costs, costs related to a disability and miscellaneous personal expenses” 
see § 15.02.2.1] related to attendance at the institution.” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 
15.02.2. See also Bill Rabinowitz, Athletic director Gene Smith discusses Ohio State football, 
playoff, transfers and more, BUCKEYEXTRA (Feb. 9, 2020, 5:31 AM), https://www.buckeyex-
tra.com/sports/20200209/athletic-director-gene-smith-discusses-ohio-state-football-playoff-
transfers-and-more. The longstanding Ohio State University Athletic Director, Gene Smith, 
was asked about one of the NCAA Committees he served on that was addressing the NIL 
issue. Smith stated: 
I think it [i.e. NILs] won’t be resolved until 2021. We need federal assistance to 
come up with something as standard across the country. You can’t have all these 
states having different laws. Otherwise, this thing falls apart. We have to do some-
thing with NIL, and the more I got into it, the more I realized there are things we 
can do that can be regulated. There are things that will require minimum legislation. 
There are things that are going to require major regulation. 
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services.22  In O’Bannon’s wake, collegiate athletics programs across the 
nation still struggle to balance their budgets to cover the full cost of at-
tendance.23 
The Changing Landscape of Intercollegiate Athletics—The Need to 
Revisit the NCAA’s “No Agent Rule” (No Agent Rule), examines the 
NCAA’s regulation of agents given recent economic and societal 
changes impacting its business model,24 especially in light of the recent 
report by the blue ribbon NCAA task force, the Rice Commission on 
College Basketball.25  NCAA President, Mark Emmert, created the com-
mission after the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York reported “the arrest of ten persons for involvement in fraud and 
corruption schemes related to college basketball.”26 
Part II of this article briefly describes the NCAA’s history and its 
efforts to create and enforce intercollegiate athletic rules promoting im-
portant principles, such as amateurism27 and fundamental purposes, such 
as maintaining “a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate and 
professional sports.”28  This background discussion is important for a 
fuller understanding of the NCAA’s longstanding and controversial prin-
ciple of amateurism that generally prohibits student-athletes and their 
 
 22. But see Nw. Univ. & College Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 
1350, 2015 NLRB LEXIS 613, *1, 204 L.R.R.M. 1001, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P15,999, 
362 NLRB No. 167 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 2015) (declining to assert jurisdiction over Northwest-
ern’s petition to treat student athletes receiving grant-in-aid scholarships as university em-
ployees). 
 23. Telephone Interview with Lawrence R. Williams, Athletic Dir., Univ. of Akron Ath-
letic Director (Apr. 7, 2020) (confirming the struggle to balance university athletic budgets 
given the need to cover the full cost of attendance). See Elton Alexander, New NCAA rule 
adds money to athletic scholarships, but can strain athletic budgets, CLEVELAND.COM, 
https://www.cleveland.com/sports/college/2015/05/new_ncaa_rule_adds_money_to_at.html 
(last updated Jan. 11, 2019). 
 24. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text. 
 25. RICE REPORT, supra note 14. For a list of the Rice Commission’s distinguished mem-
bers, see infra note 192. 
 26. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. The ten individuals included “four NCAA Divi-
sion I college basketball coaches, the head of Global Sports Marketing–Basketball and two 
individuals affiliated with a major athletic apparel company, and three athletic advisors.” Id.; 
United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying defendants’ joint 
motion to dismiss the indictment); see Part IV infra for a more detailed discussion of Gatto. 
 27. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.9 (“Student-athletes should be amateurs in an 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education, and 
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercolle-
giate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.”). 
 28. Id. § 1.3.1 (highlighting the NCAA’s longstanding “basic purpose” to “maintain in-
tercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an inte-
gral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between 
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”) (emphasis added). 
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families from using an “agent for the purpose of marketing his or her 
athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”29 
Part III of the No Agent Rule examines the representational role of 
sports agents.  This part discusses the key services that agents offer ath-
letes in helping them to realize their full potential in sports and other 
related endeavors.  Part III also considers national and state laws affect-
ing agent conduct. 
Part IV discusses United States v. Gatto and its connection to the 
NCAA’s Commission on College Basketball.30  This commission, com-
monly referred to as the Rice Commission, in recognition of its Chair, 
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, has already impacted intercollegiate sports.31  
The Rice Commission’s work supports, if not portends, additional regu-
latory changes to intercollegiate athletics, in particular, the NCAA’s 
rules governing the relationship between agents and student-athletes. 
Part V examines interdisciplinary literature and surveys that pro-
vide a valuable context for assessing the merits of the NCAA’s general 
rule barring student-athlete access to agents.  This part balances the po-
tential benefits and detriments of extending the Rice Commission’s 
 
 29. Id. § 12.3.1. 
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or 
she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the pur-
pose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an 
agency contract not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall 
be deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible to partici-
pate in any sport . . . . 
Id. The NCAA’s amateurism principle and its general ban on student athletes using sports 
agents generates substantial literature, much of it critical. See generally, e.g., Christopher M. 
Hartley, Double Fault: How the NCAA’s No-Agent Rule Serves Legal and Policy Errors Into 
the Courts of Tennis, 72 ARK. L. REV. 553 (2020); Alicia Jessop, Students First: The Need for 
Adoption of Education and Incentive-Based Sport Agent Policies by NCAA Division I FBS 
Member Institutions, 29 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 197 (2019); Sarah Lytal, Ending the Ama-
teurism Façade—Pay College Athletes, 9 HOUS. L. REV. 158 (2019); Cody J. McDavis, The 
Value of Amateurism, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275 (2018); Seth Myers, An Intentional 
Foul: Corruption in NCAA Basketball & The Aftermath of the 2017 Scandal, 15 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (2019). Although the NCAA rule restricting the use of 
agents is the focus of this article, it is only one of several NCAA rules enforcing amateurism. 
See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL supra note 19, §§ 12.2.7, 12.1.3. 
 30. United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019). 
 31. For example, the NCAA adopted several Rice Commission recommendations, in-
cluding a new, albeit limited, agent certification program for only elite Division I Men’s Bas-
ketball players. NCAA Enforcement Certification and Approvals Group (ECAG), Agent Cer-
tification Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/enforce-
ment/ecag/agent/ECAG_AgentCertificationFAQ.pdf. See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 
19, § 15.01.5.2.1 (authorizing financial aid based on certain conditions to support former bas-
ketball student-athletes who wish to return to college and complete their first baccalaureate 
degree). 
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recommendation for elite Division I Men’s Basketball players access to 
agents to all intercollegiate athletes.  Part V identifies several compelling 
reasons why student-athletes may need and benefit from the assistance 
of sports agents.  Part V finds that the benefits of agents outweigh any 
risks and that such risks can be ameliorated by less restrictive regulatory 
measures, such as heightened agent oversight, than the current broad ban 
against agents. 
Part VI suggests that, due to recent changes in intercollegiate sports, 
the time is ripe for the NCAA to adopt a Modified Agent Rule (MAR) 
permitting all student-athletes to enjoy the professional assistance of 
NCAA certified agents.  The adoption of such a policy need not under-
mine the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism. 
The conclusion recommends the NCAA abandon its general ban on 
sports agents and replace it as soon as possible with a MAR.  The MAR 
would incorporate some of the current NCAA restrictions concerning 
sports agents and also adopt provisions from other regulatory regimes, 
like the Revised Uniform Athlete Agent Act (RUAAA).32  Such a change 
will promote student-athlete welfare by alleviating some of the personal 
stress and other unique challenges impeding student-athlete success. 
II. THE NCAA—THE OVERLORD OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 
The concept that the NCAA functions like an “overlord” regarding 
college athletics is not new and has been discussed by scholars,33 current 
and former student-athletes,34 and media sources.35  The term reflects the 
NCAA’s enormous power and control over the college sports industry.  
Like any industry overlord, changing the way the NCAA does business 
can be complex and difficult, often requiring public or other outside 
pressure.36 
 
 32. See infra Part II, Section B (discussing the RUAAA). 
 33. See Sahl, supra note 1, at 624-40; Joe Nocera & Ben Strauss, Here’s How The NCAA 
Hurts College Athletes, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://for-
tune.com/2016/02/27/how-ncaa-hurts-college-players/. 
 34. Jenni Fink, 89 Percent of College Varsity Athletes Think NCAA Takes Advantage of 
Student Athletes, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 6, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazo-
naws.com/enforcement/ecag/agent/ECAG_AgentCertGuidelines.pdf; Katelyn Ohashi, Eve-
ryone Made Money Off My N.C.A.A. Career, Except Me, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/katelyn-ohashi-fair-play-act.html. 
 35. Jamil Smith, The NCAA Will Evolve, or Die, ROLLINGSTONE (Oct. 4, 2019, 4:04 
PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/political-commentary/ncaa-california-gavin-
newsom-895160/. 
 36. Will Hobson, NCAA softens on allowing college athletes to be paid, but provides few 
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A. Overview—The NCAA and Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics 
The need to regulate intercollegiate athletics has existed for well 
over a century and half.37  During the period of 1840 through 1910, 
“there was a movement from loose student control of athletics to faculty 
oversight . . . to the creation of conferences, and, ultimately, to the de-
velopment of a national entity for governance purposes.”38  Some of the 
impetus for this change emanated from university presidents; for exam-
ple, Harvard’s President Eliot, was alarmed by the increasing commer-
cialization of intercollegiate athletics.39  Similarly, the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology’s President Walker, quipped that if the rate of 
commercialization continued there would be a question about whether 
“B.A. [stood] more for Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Athletics”–a quip 
that still resonates today as a truthful depiction of intercollegiate athlet-
ics.40 
In 1905, more than eighteen deaths and one hundred major injuries 
in college football prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to invite of-
ficials from major football programs to the White House to resolve the 
problem.41  This effort led to the creation of the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association (IAA) with sixty-two members, renamed in 1910 as the 
NCAA, with the primary mission of formulating rules for various sports 
to promote fair competition and amateurism.42 
 
 37. See Smith, supra note 4 (providing a rich and concise discussion about the NCAA’s 
origins and other related developments while also offering some thoughts about the future). 
Smith notes that “[o]ne of the earliest intercollegiate events” was a commercially sponsored 
“highbrow [Yale-Harvard] regatta” in which Harvard sought an unfair advantage by using a 
coxswain who was not a student. Id. at 10-11; see also RUSS VERSTEEG & JACK P. SAHL, 
SPORTS LAW CASES & MATERIALS 353, 352-59 (4th ed. 2019) [hereinafter VERSTEEG & 
SAHL] (providing a brief historical review of the NCAA). 
 38. Smith, supra note 4, at 12-13; see VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 353-54 (of-
fering additional excerpts of Smith’s article, supra note 4). 
 39. Smith, supra note 4, at 11. 
 40. Id. 
 41. James v. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 
9, 12 (1985); Smith, supra note 4, at 12. 
 42. Koch, supra note 41, at 12 (stating “[a]n additional concern of Roosevelt and others 
was the preservation of amateurism.”); Smith, supra note 4, at 12; see United States v. Gatto, 
295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Today, “[t]he NCAA is a non-profit organization 
that regulates athletics for colleges and universities. NCAA member schools are organized 
into three separate divisions: Divisions I, II, and III. Division I is the ‘highest level of inter-
collegiate athletics sanctioned by the NCAA.’ ”  Id. “Schools with Division I athletics pro-
grams typically have the largest athletics budgets and offer the most athletic scholarships, 
subject to NCAA regulations.” Id. Currently, Division I has 350 member schools. NCAA Di-
vision I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Aug. 22, 2020). In the 
early 1950s, the NCAA “was transformed from a coordinating organization that was largely 
confined to rulemaking and sponsoring championships, to one that had considerable financial 
clout” because the NCAA was negotiating valuable television contacts for its members and 
 
12 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol.61 
Commercialism in intercollegiate sports continued to grow after 
1910, causing the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Educa-
tion to issue a report in 1929, calling for the diminishment of commer-
cialism and for college presidents to “reclaim the integrity of the sport.”43  
Despite the NCAA’s efforts to answer this call to reign in commercial-
ism, it could not “keep pace with the growing commercialization of, and 
interest in, intercollegiate athletics.”44  Some of this increase in commer-
cialism was caused by sports fans’ widespread use of radio and televi-
sion to follow college sports, World War II veterans returning and at-
tending college in large numbers, and colleges adding or expanding 
athletic programs.45  This period of commercial growth was emblematic 
of a more global concern. 
That concern is the perpetual clash between two fundamental forces 
in the NCAA.  One force involves the NCAA’s overriding commitment 
to amateurism and its focus on the educational and cultural development 
of student-athletes.46  The second, countervailing force entails the ever-
increasing commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and its corro-
sive effect on the principle of amateurism.47  The end result of this clash 
has left the NCAA in a continuous search for a viably durable equilib-
rium between amateurism and commercialization in intercollegiate ath-
letics.48 
In an effort to “reclaim” or promote integrity in intercollegiate ath-
letics, the NCAA in 1951 created the Committee on Infractions (COI) 
with broad sanctioning authority to facilitate rule compliance.49  During 
the 1950s and 1960s, the NCAA’s enforcement capacity increased an-
nually, in part because of a strong executive director, Walter Byers,50 
 
punishing them for rule violations, including severe financial penalties. See generally Koch, 
supra note 41, at 13-14.  
 43. Smith, supra note 4, at 14; VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 354-55. 
 44. Smith, supra note 4, at 14. 
 45. Id. at 14-15. 
 46. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 2.5, 2.9. 
 47. Gurney, supra note 1, at 3-24. 
 48. See generally Kelly Charles Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for A New Tradi-
tion, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 181 (2017) (examining the amateurism tradition in college 
sports from cultural and legal perspectives and contending it is a flawed cultural theme and 
that the NCAA should abandon its amateurism theme and adopt a new tradition whereby stu-
dent athletes can exploit their name, image and likeness and all athletes receive reasonable 
compensation for their labors). 
 49. Smith, supra note 4, at 15. 
 50. Id.; Jack McCallum, IN THE KINGDOM OF THE SOLITARY MAN, SPORTS 
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and due to additional revenue from lucrative contracts to broadcast in-
tercollegiate sports.51  In the early 1970s, the NCAA also created divi-
sions reflecting the competitive capacity of schools.52  By enacting this 
change, the NCAA hoped to create a more balanced playing field among 
competitors.  During this time, enhanced rule enforcement by the NCAA 
prompted criticism that its rules and enforcement were unfair.53  The 
NCAA created a committee to study these criticisms and, in 1973, 
adopted one of its key recommendations to divide the prosecutorial and 
investigative roles of the COI.54 
By 1976, the NCAA obtained new authority to enforce its rules by 
penalizing schools directly, and thus indirectly penalizing the school’s 
administrators, coaches, and student-athletes.55  Perhaps because of this 
new authority, criticisms of the NCAA enforcement regime persisted 
and in 1978, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Over-
sights and Investigation conducted hearings regarding the fairness of 
NCAA enforcement practices.56 
Against a background of high profile intercollegiate scandals that 
the New York Times concluded left a “stench in college sport,”57 
 
 51. Koch, supra note 41, at 13-14; Smith, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that the NCAA 
negotiated its first million-dollar contract to televise intercollegiate football in the 1950s); see 
also Branch, supra note 2 (“On June 6, 1952, NBC signed a one-year deal to pay the NCAA 
$1.14 million for a carefully restricted football package.”); see generally Allen R. Sanderson 
& John J. Siegfried, The Role of Broadcasting in National Collegiate Athletic Association 
Sports, 52 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 305, 309-11 (Oct. 24, 2017) (describing the history of broad-
cast deals with the NCAA from 1921 to the present). 
 52. Smith, supra note 4, at 15. 
 53. David F. Gaona, The National Collegiate Athletic Association: Fundamental Fair-
ness and the Enforcement Program, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1981) (recognizing that a 
major criticism of the COI’s procedures and tactics was the unfairness of COI being involved 
in the entire investigation and adjudication of a matter when the roles of investigator-prose-
cutor and adjudicator needed to be separate); Smith, supra note 4, at 15. 
 54. Gaona, supra note 53, at 1071-72 (acknowledging the NCAA unfused the COI’s 
roles of being both an investigator-prosecutor and an adjudicator with the former function 
now performed by a special investigative staff, and the adjudicator function still handled by 
the COI; the NCAA Council functions as the NCAA’s appellate tribunal); Smith, supra note 
4, at 15. 
 55. Smith, supra note 4, at 16. 
 56. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 356 (quoting Smith, supra note 4, at 16). 
 57. HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, CHANGING THE PLAYBOOK: HOW POWER, PROFIT, AND 
POLITICS TRANSFORMED COLLEGE SPORTS 110 (Randy Roberts et al. eds. 2015) [hereinafter 
CHUDACOFF]. Chapter 6 provides an interesting discussion of some of the NCAA’s most 
prominent scandals ranging from improper payments to athletes (e.g., Southern Methodist 
University (SMU) boosters “funneling secret payments to players” with at least the tacit sup-
port of SMU’s Board of Governors and the cooperation of its head football coach, ultimately 
resulting in the NCAA’s “death penalty” sanction or cancelation of all of its football games 
in 1987, id. at 105-06), to academic fraud (e.g., the PAC-10 Conference barred five members 
from participating in the 1981 Rose Bowl because of academic fraud; one of those schools 
was Arizona State, after eight football players passed a summer make-up mathematics course 
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university and college presidents faced with declining enrollments paid 
closer attention to intercollegiate athletics in the 1980s.58  Presidents 
viewed athletic departments as an auxiliary unit with ever rising costs 
but also as a potential to generate non-tuition based revenue and positive 
publicity.59  The presidents also appreciated that their reputations and 
jobs were increasingly tied to their athletic departments and intercolle-
giate athletics.60  Influential university trustees, alumni, faculty, and oth-
ers pressured presidents to adopt policies and strategies to create suc-
cessful intercollegiate sports programs.61  In 1984, the presidents formed 
the President’s Commission and called a special convention in 1985, in 
part to recommend rule changes with an eye to cost containment. The 
President’s Commission produced mixed results.62 
A little over a decade later, the presidents’ involvement grew to the 
extent that they had changed the very governance structure of the 
NCAA, with the addition of an Executive Committee and a Board of 
Directors for the various divisions, both of which are made up of 
presidents or chief executive officers.63 
In 1991, the presidents helped create a blue ribbon committee called 
the “Special Committee to Review the NCAA Enforcement and Infrac-
tions Process” (Special Committee)64 headed by President Rex E. Lee of 
 
but never attended a class, id. at 111) and game cheating (e.g., the Tulane and Boston College 
men’s basketball point-shaving schemes, the latter occurring in 1978-79 and involving mob-
ster Henry Hill whose life became the subject of the 1990 movie Goodfellas, id. at 110). 
 58. Smith, supra note 4, at 16; see Sean Silverthorne, Diagnosing the ‘Flutie Effect’ on 
College Marketing, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Apr. 29, 2013), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/diagnos-
ing-the-flutie-effect-on-college-marketing. 
 59. Smith, supra note 4, at 16; see Silverthorne, supra note 58, at 53 (discussing the 
Flutie Effect or the institutional impact of Doug Flutie on Boston College (BC) when he threw 
a legendary, last second, “Hail Mary” pass to defeat the University of Miami in football, for 
example, BC applications “shot up 30 percent” in the two years following the win; also re-
porting that in general, “[w]hen a school rises from mediocre to great on the gridiron, appli-
cations increase by 17.1 percent . . . schools become more academically selective with athletic 
success,” and that “[w]inning programs prosper in diverse ways including ticket and product 
sales, alumni donations, and TV contracts”). 
 60. Smith, supra note 4, at 16. 
 61. Id. This is largely still the case as evidenced by a remark from the new president of 
the University of Akron, Dr. Gary Anderson, when asked about what he was going to do with 
Akron’s football program. He emphatically replied, “[t]he quickest way for a president to get 
fired is to either drop or add college football.” This statement was conveyed to the University 
of Akron Law School faculty during a meeting with the president in 2019. 
 62. Smith, supra note 4, at 17 (“These efforts [at making rule changes in hopes of cost 
containment] were not all successful.”); VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 331. 
 63. Smith, supra note 4, at 17. 
 64. This Commission was a response to the Supreme Court decision in NCAA v. Tar-
kanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). In Tarkanian, the Court found that the NCAA was authorized 
to conduct investigations and hearings, but as a private entity it is not subject to constitutional 
due process requirements. Although not required to do so, the Tarkanian case caused the 
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Brigham Young University with other prominent members such as for-
mer Chief Justice Warren E. Burger.65  The NCAA adopted some of the 
Special Committee’s recommendations, for example, allowing the tape 
recording of witness interviews and adding outside members to the 
COI.66  Although the Special Committee’s efforts improved the NCAA 
enforcement process, it nevertheless remained flawed as the NCAA “re-
jected the [Special Committee’s recommendation for] both an independ-
ent trier of fact and open hearings.”67  One critical assessment of the 
NCAA’s rule enforcement process following the Special Committee’s 
recommendations stated the following: 
Given the persistent criticism and widespread agreement regarding 
the NCAA’s flawed enforcement system, most would think it neces-
sary to restore public confidence in this NCAA governance function. 
Key among important changes for all cases with the potential of sig-
nificant consequences should be the installation of discovery mech-
anisms and enhanced procedural protections for individuals and in-
stitutions.68 
“In the late 1990s, the presidents became increasingly concerned 
about student welfare” and enacted rules to protect student-athletes, for 
example, by enacting the twenty-hour rule.69  This rule limited the 
amount of time that coaches could ask student-athletes to practice and 
compete in their sport to twenty hours per week in hopes of safeguarding 
time for academic and other campus pursuits.70  Rule 2.9 of the Division 
I Manual provides: 
 
NCAA to appreciate some of the serious procedural flaws in its investigation and hearing 
processes. GURNEY, supra note 1, at 99; see Smith, supra note 4, at 17; see generally Sahl, 
supra note 1 (providing a detailed discussion of Tarkanian). 
 65. Smith, supra note 4, at 17-18. 
 66. Gurney, supra note 1, at 99. 
 67. Id. at 99-100. 
 68. Id. at 100. 
 69. MATHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & ROBERT C. BERRY, 
SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 106 (2d ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter MITTEN]. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 17.1.7.1 (limiting participation 
in athletically related activities during the season to four hours per day and twenty hours per 
week) (adopted Jan. 10, 1991) (effective Aug. 1, 1991). 
 70. MITTEN, supra note 69, at 107. The twenty-hour rule represented an important offi-
cial step toward preserving adequate time for athletes to focus on their academic work and 
cultural and social development. Unfortunately, the important benefits of this rule have been 
undermined by unofficial demands for the athlete’s time; for example, “captain practices,” 
voluntary practices led by team captains, and not so subtle encouragement to engage in related 
off-season athletic activities, such as, playing soccer for a particular summer club. See Peter 
Jacobs, Here’s The Insane Amount Of Time Student-Athletes Spend On Practice, BUS. 
INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/college-student-ath-
letes-spend-40-hours-a-week-practicing-2015-1 (reporting that NCAA Division I FBS foot-
ball players on average practice forty-three and three tenths hours per week, men’s basketball 
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Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and 
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived from such 
pursuits. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avo-
cation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.71 
Similarly, Rule 2.2, titled “The Principle of Student Well-Being,” 
states: “[i]ntercollegiate athletic programs shall be conducted in a man-
ner designed to protect and enhance the physical and educational well-
being of student-athletes.”72  The NCAA’s twenty-hour rule, like the re-
quirement  that “[d]uring the playing season, all countable athletically 
related activities . . . shall be prohibited during one calendar day per 
week,” prohibition on hiring agents were designed to promote, amateur-
ism by enhancing the amateur athlete’s student interests or educational 
and cultural enrichment.73 
The NCAA period from 1980 through 2000 has been described as 
“active” with a “meteoric rise” in both revenue74 and the commerciali-
zation of intercollegiate sports.75  This rise occurred at a time when col-
lege presidents were still grappling with the increasing costs of higher 
education, including expenses associated with the “arms race” or the ex-
pansion of athletic facilities and staff, declining enrollment, and daunt-
ing budgetary constraints because of an economic downturn.76 
By 2000, college presidents consolidated their power within the 
NCAA.77  They launched a major academic reform effort to increase the 
 
averages thirty-nine and two tenths hours of practice per week, and Division I Women’s Bas-
ketball practices roughly thirty-seven and sixth tenths hours per week). 
 71. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.9. The Principle of Sound Academic Standards 
is another provision emphasizing the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism and education.  
Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the 
educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student 
body. The admission, academic standing and academic progress of student-athletes 
shall be consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the 
student body in general. 
 Id. § 2.5. 
 72. Id. § 2.2. 
 73. Id. § 17.1.7.4 (Requiring Day Off—Playing Season) (adopted Jan. 10, 1991) (effec-
tive Aug. 1, 1991). For other rules during this period that were intended to promote amateur-
ism and student-athlete interests and educational enrichment see e.g., id. § 17.1.7.10.2 (No 
Class Time Missed for Practice Activities) (adopted Jan. 10, 1991) (effective Aug. 1, 1991). 
 74. MITTEN, supra note 69, at 107. For example, the NCAA and CBS agreed to a $1.725 
billion, eight-year television contract for the rights to Division I Men’s Basketball games—
commonly referred to as March Madness. Id. at 106. This influx of money helped the NCAA 
expand and increase its support for Division I members. Id. 
 75. Id. at 107. 
 76. Id. at 106-07. 
 77. Id. at 107. 
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academic progress and graduation rates of student-athletes, especially in 
the revenue-producing sports of football and men’s basketball, where 
graduation rates were dismal and generated much criticism.78  Amid fes-
tering criticism about the NCAA’s failure to ensure that intercollegiate 
athletes received a meaningful education leading to graduation, the 
NCAA created the Annual Academic Progress Rate (AAPR) in 2003 
which generates a real-time assessment of team academic performance.79  
The AAPR requires student-athletes to declare a major and to complete 
a minimum number of credits per semester toward earning a degree 
while maintaining a minimum grade point average.80  The AAPR en-
hanced institutional accountability for ensuring student-athletes met 
NCAA academic progress and graduation rate benchmarks, in part, by 
providing incentives and disincentives, for example, the loss of athletic 
scholarships.81  Nevertheless, some critics contend that academic cheat-
ing still continues as schools have found new and more sophisticated 
ways to avoid AAPR penalties.82 
In 2020, the intercollegiate athletics’ landscape is still being shaped 
by the ever-growing forces of commercialism and the increasing power 
of big, elite football and basketball programs to drive intercollegiate reg-
ulatory policy while lesser situated athletic programs struggle to keep 
up.83  This development was underscored in August 2014 when the 
“NCAA Board of Directors (now called the Board of Governors) granted 
legislative autonomy to the five wealthiest conferences in the Football 
Bowl Subdivision (FBS) representing sixty-five institutions and adopted 
a new governance structure to provide greater operational control to ath-
letic directors and conference representatives.”84  The president of Boise 
State University characterized the autonomy legislation as a “ ‘ power 
 
 78. Id. at 105, 107. 
 79. Division I Academic Progress Rate (APR), NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/re-
sources/research/division-i-academic-progress-rate-apr (last visited Sep. 25, 2020). 
 80. MITTEN, supra note 69, at 107, 137. 
 81. Id. at 107-08 (reporting that the creation of amateurism clearinghouse legislation by 
the NCAA Division I and II Management Councils to deal with amateurism issues related to 
prospective domestic and international athletes and the AARP “are bearing some fruit, in 
terms of increased academic progress . . . with the implementation of sanctions related to ac-
ademic progress reporting.”). 
 82. GURNEY, supra note 1, at 39 (citing Brad Wolverton, Confessions of a Fixer, CHRON. 
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/confessions-of-a-
fixer/) (describing a “vast scheme of cheating among, elite revenue-generating football and 
basketball athletes and coaches” where an “aspiring basketball coach took online classes at 
Brigham Young University and Adams State University for hundreds of elite athletes needing 
. . . course credit hours and grades for initial and continuing eligibility[;]” and “uncover[ing] 
a similar scheme for basketball players at the University of Texas.”). 
 83. See id. at 18-19. 
 84. Id. at 18. 
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grab’ that facilitated the NCAA’s attempt to perpetuate the dominance 
of a few dozen universities with the most resources to pull the strings.”85  
University and college presidents emphasized their need to retain control 
of athletics in order for this new governance model to work, although the 
validity of that assertion remains unproven.86  “In January 2015 the 
NCAA formally adopted super-conference autonomy in governance [as 
the] presidents from the five wealthiest conferences, known as the Power 
Five . . . reasoned that modern big-time sport was its own-ecosystem, 
and its issues and the ability to resolve them were unique to their insti-
tutions.”87 
Today and throughout the NCAA’s long and colorful history, no 
matter the development, travail, or success, a key NCAA hallmark is that 
student-athletes must be amateurs rather than professionals.88  The 
NCAA is committed to maintaining a line of demarcation between am-
ateur and professional or commercial athletic activity.  NCAA rules 
clearly prohibit certain activity as professional and crossing that demar-
cation line results in exclusion of the student-athlete from any further 
participation in intercollegiate sports.  For example, one clear prohibi-
tion and the focus of this article concerns student-athlete use of agents.  
“Student-athletes, prospective student-athletes, and their relatives are 
prohibited from accepting any benefits, including money, travel, cloth-
ing, or other merchandise, directly or indirectly from a financial advisor 
or an agent.”89  The term agent “is defined broadly to include anyone 
‘who, directly or indirectly . . . seeks to obtain any type of financial gain 
or benefit . . . from a student-athlete’s potential earnings as a profes-
sional athlete.’ ” 90  The NCAA first adopted the No Agent Rule in 1974, 
in part to promote the principle of amateurism and to maintain the line 
of demarcation between amateur and professional sports.91 
 
 85. Id. at 18-19. The Boise State University President further declared: “It seems they 
[the big elite programs] are never satisfied with their bloated athletic budgets, especially when 
threatened in recent years by upstart, so-called mid-major programs that steal recruits, often-
times beat the big-boys, ‘mess with’ the national rankings and sometimes take postseason 
bowl games and revenue.” Id. 
 86. Id. at 18. 
 87. Id. at 19. 
 88. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3 (Article I of the NCAA Constitution highlights 
the NCAA’s longstanding “basic purpose” to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral 
part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by 
so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”) (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. § 12.3.2; see United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 90. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.02.1. 
 91. See id. § 12.3.1 (“An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercolle-
giate sport if he or she has ever agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for 
the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an 
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It is not always clear what kind of student-athlete conduct crosses 
the amateur-professional demarcation line.  For example, Part V of this 
article argues that the NCAA should permit student-athletes to retain 
sports agents and that such retention does not automatically and magi-
cally transform an amateur student-athlete’s efforts into professional 
work.92  It is worth noting that other amateur sports organizations do not 
share the NCAA’s belief that its commitment to amateurism requires a 
No Agent Rule.93  For example, the United States Golf Association’s 
Rules of Amateur Golf permits amateur members to hire agents and earn 
compensation unrelated to winning a tournament.94  Nevertheless, the 
NCAA’s longstanding No Agent Rule has continued largely undisturbed 
for decades, even with the myriad of developments and changes, such as 
the O’Bannon decision, impacting the NCAA.  That period of non-dis-
turbance changed with the Rice Commission’s recommendation in 2018 
that elite Division I Men’s Basketball players be entitled to agents.95 
III. SPORTS AGENTS 
It is important to understand the special role that sports agents play 
in their client-athletes’ personal and professional lives before attempting 
to regulate agent conduct.  The agent’s role in helping an athlete succeed 
 
agency contract not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall be 
deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible to participate in any 
sport.”); see David Wade, Inside the Rules: the NCAA “No Agent” Rule, HARDBALL TIMES 
(Feb. 8, 2011), https://tht.fangraphs.com/inside-the-rules-ncaa-no-agent-rule/ (explaining that 
the rule was enacted in 1974 when the NCAA conceded to allow players to seek professional 
advice, but prohibited advisors from negotiating directly with professional teams). 
 92. See infra Part V. 
 93. See GURNEY, supra note 1, at 15 (“The NCAA has modified rules in ways that have 
little to do with the core notion of amateurism (that is, not being paid to play a sport) and are 
inconsistent with those of other amateur organizations.”). 
 94. Id. The Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) permits payments to its athletes during train-
ing or competition periods to cover their lost earnings during this time; they can also receive 
endorsement income. Id. The NCAA’s effort to protect amateurism creates some curious re-
sults; European tennis players can earn up to $10,000 for playing tennis during high school 
and still be eligible for NCAA tennis whereas a similarly situated United States player would 
not be eligible. Id. at 15–16. A rule like this treating European players differently seems arbi-
trary on its face and could lead some to criticize the NCAA rules as unfair. 
 95. On August 8, 2018, the NCAA adopted the Rice Commission’s recommendation that 
elite Division I Men’s Basketball players be permitted to retain an agent’s services. NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 12.02.1.2, 12.3.1.2.2. This exception to the NCAA’s No Agent 
Rule is accompanied by a related NCAA agent certification process. See ECAG, supra note 
31, at 6-8. This process became operational in August 2019 and has raised some concerns, in 
part, about it imposing “overly burdensome prerequisites” for NCAA agent certification and 
having a “procedurally flawed” and an unfair enforcement scheme. See Marc Edelman & 
Richard Karcher, The NCAA’s Agent Certification Program: A Critical Legal Analysis, 11 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 155, 162, 167-69, 182 (2020); see infra Part IV for a discussion 
of the Rice Commission. 
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is multifaceted and demanding—a 24/7 job.  The athlete’s first call is 
often to his or her agent for help with important and even minor athletics-
related and other personal needs.  The agent-athlete relationship is very 
personal and built upon trust, support, and communication—similar to 
the fiduciary relationship that lawyers have with clients.  Agents need to 
be accessible for their athlete-clients or risk losing them, given the in-
tense competition among agents for athletes.96 
A. The Role of Sports Agents 
“Historically, the agent’s role primarily involved negotiating the 
athlete’s performance contract with a team or a sponsor of an event, such 
as a tennis tournament.”97  While sports agents still perform this task, 
“agents today are often expected to provide additional services, such as 
financial, tax, and estate planning, public relations, travel assistance,” 
career counseling, “and security, or find others who can provide such 
services.”98 
Large talent agencies, like IMG and Creative Artists Agency, offer 
clients “one-stop shopping” convenience where generally all of the tal-
ent’s service needs are provided in-house by the large agency.99  Indi-
vidual agents and smaller agencies commonly assemble a team of 
 
 96. See Bob Nightengale, Albert Pujols, agent wary of rivals aiming to land star, USA 
TODAY, http://usatoday.com/sports/baseball/story/2011-09-22/Dan-Lazono-Albert-Pujols-
Scott-Boras/50522204/1 (last updated Sept. 23, 2011, 12:39 PM) (noting the efforts of other 
agents to lure agent Dan Lozano’s all-star baseball player-client, Albert Pujols, by criticizing 
Lozano and prompting one agent to state, “[u]nfortunately for our business, it’s typical . . . 
It’s not pretty.”). 
 97. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 392; see Lionel S. Sobel, The Regulation of 
Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 701, 705-06 (1987). 
 98. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 392; W. Jack Grosse & Eric Warren, The Reg-
ulation, Control, and Protection of Athletic Agents, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 53 (1991); Our 
Services, WILLIS SPORTS AGENTS, https://www.willissports.com/our-services/ (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2020). 
 99. There has been notable consolidation in the agency field. For example, in 2009 the 
William Morris Agency and Endeavor merged to form WME—the biggest talent agency mer-
ger ever. Our Story, ENDEAVOR, http://endeavorco.com/story/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2020). In 
2014, WME (William Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC) acquired IMG, the first, large 
international sports agency in the United States created by Mark McCormack in 1960 and 
based in Cleveland, Ohio. Id.; Frank Litsky, Mark H. McCormack, 72, Pioneer of Sports Mar-
keting, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/17/sports/mark-h-
mccormack-72-pioneer-of-sports-marketing.html; The tragedy of Mark McCormack and 
IMG, CMG PARTNERS (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.cmgpartners.ca/mccormack-family (as-
serting that McCormack “created the industry of sports marketing”). The combined entity was 
renamed Endeavor in 2017. Our Story, IMG, http://img.com/story/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) 
(“[IMG] is one of the largest independent producers and distributors of sports media” and 
“specializes in sports training, league development; and marketing, media and licensing for 
brands, sports organizations and collegiate institutions.”). 
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outside advisors to assist in servicing some of the athlete’s diverse 
needs.100  These advisors work closely with the agent. In this scenario, 
the agent functions like the head of an operations control room, manag-
ing the various advisors’ efforts on behalf of the athlete.101 
The agent’s role for an athlete is largely determined by the agency 
contract.  It is important for the agent to know what kind of support the 
client-athlete needs or expects.  Those needs should be noted in the 
agency contract.102  The contract may be broadly worded to include a 
number of functions, all of which entitle the agent to charge a commis-
sion.103 
One of the agent’s first responsibilities is negotiating an employ-
ment contract between the athlete and the party (e.g., sports franchise) 
purchasing the athlete’s services.  Agents must understand the athlete’s 
sports industry and the financial status of the prospective purchaser to 
effectively negotiate favorable terms in the athlete’s employment con-
tract.  The agent needs to build a case for the athlete’s value, for example, 
by noting coaching and scouting recommendations, prior athletic accom-
plishments (e.g., scoring records and other honors), and physical evalu-
ations (e.g., agility and speed).104  The agent compares his client’s talents 
and accomplishments with similar benchmarks for current and former 
athletes in the industry to gauge the client’s fair market value.105  In some 
sports, such as basketball and football, the agent’s work will be influ-
enced by overarching collective bargaining agreements negotiated be-
tween player associations and team owners, such as in basketball and 
football.106  These agreements will guide the agent’s work and require 
 
 100. One example of a successful smaller agency was ICON Management, in Stow, Ohio 
that represented golfers and other talent. International Management Group (IMG) ultimately 
acquired ICON reflecting a common scenario where larger firms expand their market presence 
by acquisitions and/or consolidations. See Icon Sports Management, PITCHBOOK, 
https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/109234-45 (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
 101. Grosse & Warren, supra note 98, at 53 (noting agents will retain oversight of other 
personnel delivering services to their client, the talent or athlete). 
 102. For example, Article III of the Uniform Sports Agents Act (USAA) would require 
agency contracts with student athletes to specify the services to be provided. Phillip N. Fluhr, 
Jr., The Regulation of Sports Agents and the Quest for Uniformity, 6 SPORTS L. J. 1, 17 (1999). 
 103. Grosse & Warren, supra note 98, at 53. 
 104. Sobel, supra note 97, at 705-06. 
 105. Id. at 706 (“Player agents also perform another function in negotiations—one that 
requires the sort of knowledge usually possessed by professionals, but not by most athletes. 
In order to properly negotiate player contracts today, it is necessary to be familiar with the 
details of collective bargaining agreements and to have knowledge of the salaries that have 
been paid to comparable players. Acquiring this knowledge is not prohibitively difficult, but 
it does require some effort and a legal, financial or business background certainly helps.”). 
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that certain league-wide minimum terms be part of the athlete’s contract.  
For example, collective bargaining agreements determine the date of free 
agency, the wearing of team athletic apparel, and the agent’s rate of com-
mission.107 
Successful agents help their client-athletes obtain product and ser-
vice endorsement deals to augment their player income.  For example, 
tennis great, Andre Agassi, appeared in Canon camera television com-
mercials in the late 1980s and early 1990s,108 as did Tiger Woods in 
Buick commercials.109  More recently, LeBron James earned $90 million 
for his product endorsement deal with Nike.110  Although these mega-
deals attract widespread attention, finding endorsement or licensing 
deals for non-star athletes is challenging.  Agents may struggle with this 
task even in local markets. 
Endorsement deals are important for most athletes, not only for the 
money but also for the exposure.  Agents might ask the athlete’s team or 
event provider with a larger market presence for help in acquiring a li-
censing deal when negotiating a player’s team or event contract.  “Some 
licensing deals require athletes to use a particular sports product, for ex-
ample, a golf club or tennis racket, during competition.”111  Some ath-
letes need the agent to handle all of the athlete’s business matters, rang-
ing from scheduling appointments to handling all financial obligations 
(e.g., collecting, depositing, and investing earnings and paying transpor-
tation and other expenses).  The line between managing business and 
personal affairs is not always clear; for example, an agent may help find 
a personal residence and then negotiate its purchase.  Some athletes pre-
fer their agent to play a greater role in managing the athletes’ personal 
 
 107. See, e.g., MLBPA, 2017-2021 BASIC AGREEMENT (2017), https://registra-
tion.mlbpa.org/pdf/Basic%20Agreement_english.pdf (declaring free agency starts at 9:00 
a.m. on the day following the last world series game, and that players can wear only club-
issued apparel during games). 
 108. See Steve Tignor, 1989: IMAGE IS EVERTHING—ANDRE AGASSI’S INFAMOUS 
AD, TENNIS.COM (Aug. 30, 2015), https://www.tennis.com/pro-game/2015/08/image-every-
thing-andre-agassis-infamous-ad/55425/; Stuart Elliot, THE MEDIA BUSINESS: Advertising; 
The Governing Body of Tennis Tries to Polish its Image., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1993), 
https://www.tennis.com/pro-game/2015/08/image-everything-andre-agassis-infamous-
ad/55425/. 
 109. Laura Petrecca, GM ends 9-Year endorsement relationship with Tiger Woods, ABC 
NEWS (Nov. 25, 2008, 6:48 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Busi-
ness/story?id=6329219&page=1. 
 110. Kurt Badenhausen, LeBron James Is The NBA’s Leading Shoe Salesman, FORBES 
(May 22, 2013, 11:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/05/22/leb-
ron-james-is-the-nbas-leading-shoe-salesmen/#6906efa689d. 
 111. VERSTEEG & SAHL, supra note 37, at 393 (“An agent should negotiate an ‘escape 
clause’ permitting the athlete to switch to a different product if it is negatively affecting the 
athlete’s performance.”). 
 
2020] THE NCAA’S “NO AGENT RULE” 23 
affairs (e.g., paying for mortgages, medical insurance), freeing the ath-
letes to focus on their sports careers.112  As fiduciaries, individual agents 
and small agencies are often responsible for assembling a team of experts 
and advisors to manage the athlete’s long-term business and personal 
welfare, including the athlete’s plans for a post-sports career.113 
Many athletes’ careers last only a few years.  For example, an NFL 
player’s average career length is three and one-third seasons.114  Agents 
need to assist the athletes in developing a financial plan to provide for 
the athlete’s long-term welfare.  Agents often hire investment advisors 
and accountants to help with this function.115  The landscape of sports 
stories is replete with athletes who earned large sums of money only to 
end up destitute.  For example, one article reported that after two years 
of retirement, seventy-eight percent of former NFL players were bank-
rupt or under financial stress, and sixty percent of former NBA players 
were in a similar situation five years after retirement.116 
An overlooked, but important agent function involves developing 
and marketing the athlete’s public image.  Agents may connect athletes 
to charitable and other public events and causes that not only provide 
intrinsic rewards for the athlete but also may enhance the athlete’s mar-
ket value.117  Effective agents directly cultivate relationships with sports 
writers and other media personnel (e.g., television interviews) to cover 
 
 112. See Sobel, supra note 97, at 708. 
 113. See id. at 704-05 (discussing the increasing complexity of financial matters for ath-
letes). 
 114. Christina Gough, Average playing career length in the National Football League, 
STATISTA (Sep. 10, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/240102/average-player-career-
length-in-the-national-football-league/; see SI WIRE, WSJ data analysis shows average 
length of NFL careers decreasing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2016/03/01/nfl-careers-shortened-two-years-data-analysis (noting 
that “the average NFL career length was just 2.66 years” and concussions and health risks are 
a major reason why players walk away from the career); see also NFL PLAYERS 
ASSOCIATION, www.NFLplayers.com/about-us/FAOS/NFL-Hopeful-FAQs/ (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2020) (showing the average length of a football player’s career in 2014 to be three 
and a half seasons). The average length of a football player’s career seems to have declined at 
least slightly since 2014 which underscores the need for the agent and student-athlete to en-
gage in financial planning as soon as possible in college. Once the student athlete signs a 
player contract with an NFL team, that player’s agent must be registered and fully compliant 
with the players union, the NFLPA, rules governing agents. 
 115. See Grosse & Warren, supra note 98, at 53; Sobel, supra note 97, at 709. 
 116. Pablo S. Torre, HOW (AND WHY) ATHLETES GO BROKE, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
VAULT (Mar. 23, 2009), https://vault.si.com/vault/2009/03/23/how-and-why-athletes-go-
broke. 
 117. See, e.g., Community Relations, KMG SPORTS SERVS., https://www.kmg-
sports.com/services/#tab-id-5 (last visited Aug. 18, 2020) (describing charitable activities the 
agency is prepared to assist its clients with); General Services, KMG SPORTS SERVS., 
https://www.kmgsports.com/services/#tab-id-1 (last visited Aug. 18, 2020) (“Our job is to 
build your brand and maximize your revenue.”). 
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the athlete118 or hire public relations firms for the same purpose.  These 
firms are especially important in helping to rehabilitate an athlete’s im-
age that has suffered harm because of the athlete’s questionable con-
duct.119 
B. Regulating Sports Agents: The Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) 
and Similar Rules 
Sports agents have been associated with a variety of scandals rang-
ing from improper recruitment of athletes for a particular college, as in 
Gatto,120 to stealing from client athletes.121  The concern about rogue 
agent misconduct is cited as a primary justification for the NCAA’s No-
Agent Rule as well as for state and federal regulatory efforts.122  There 
is a general legislative consensus that sports agents require regulation.123 
 
 118. Mike Florio, Good agents do a lot more than negotiate contracts, NBC SPORTS: PRO 
FOOTBALL TALK (July 23, 2015, 11:01 AM), https://profootball-
talk.nbcsports.com/2015/07/23/good-agents-do-a-lot-more-than-negotiate-contracts/ (“Good 
agents have relationships in the media . . . .”). 
 119. See, e.g., Gene Wojciechowski, Fleischer PR won’t rebuild Tiger’s image, ESPN 
(Mar. 11, 2010), sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?id=4986830 (Tiger Woods hired 
former President George W. Bush’s Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, to handle the adverse pub-
licity stemming, in part, from Woods’ extramarital conduct). 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (ensuring high 
school basketball players would attend and play for the universities by paying high bribes); 
see infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of Gatto. 
 121. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 
AGENTS 72-87 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS] (providing a good discussion 
of well-known criminal and civil cases of misconduct against sports agents). The authors de-
scribed the landscape of agent misconduct in the following sentences: 
At the extremes, agent misconduct and malfeasance, ranging from mismanagement 
to misappropriation of athlete client’s assets to disparagement of other agents in 
order to gain a competitive advantage, fuel perceptions of an industry composed of 
individuals too willing to compromise ethics and competent representation for fi-
nancial gain. Agent impropriety overlaps with the reality of largely newly or pro-
spectively rich individuals not receiving the counseling they require to duplicate the 
success on the field with success off the field. 
Id. at 1-2. The authors also stated that “no matter the concerns that lie at the center of the 
sports agent storm, it is a business that captures the attention of many.” Id. at 1. 
 122. See Myers, supra note 29 (discussing the global importance of and related concerns 
about sports, the need to protect the integrity of sports from corruption, and state and federal 
laws that would effectively fight corruption in Division I basketball). This author contends 
that sports agents have “facilitated much of the corruption in college sports.” Id. at 75. 
 123. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 
713 (6th ed. 2019) [hereinafter WEILER] (offering a scholarly treatment of state and federal 
regulation. California was the first state to get into the business of regulating sports agents in 
1982 when it promulgated the California Athlete Agents Act, id. at 710-14). See also ROBERT 
H. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE’S GUIDE TO AGENTS 107 (5th ed. 2010) (confirming that California 
was the first state to enact a mandatory athlete-agent regulatory scheme in 1981 and noting 
that two years later NFLPA instituted a plan to protect football players). 
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By the 1990s, twenty-eight states had created a patchwork of laws 
regulating sports agents.124  Most of them imposed a registration require-
ment.125  The laws were largely ineffective as few agents registered, and 
even more unsettling from a regulatory perspective, few states devoted 
sufficient resources for adequate enforcement.126 
In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) created the Uniform Athlete Agents Acts 
(UAAA).127  By 2018, forty-three states had adopted some version of the 
UAAA.128  The UAAA’s primary purposes are the protection of student-
athletes, who may lose their NCAA eligibility by being contacted prem-
aturely by agents or improperly agreeing to sports representation, and 
the protection of universities, which may lose their time and financial 
investment in recruiting athletes and granting athletic scholarships.129 
On the federal level, the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act 
(SPARTA) was enacted in 2004.130  SPARTA prohibits almost the same 
conduct as the UAAA and uses the same definition of “athlete-agent.”131  
Unlike the UAAA, SPARTA treats violations as unfair trade practices, 
which may be prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or 
 
 124. See WEILER, supra note 123, at 710-11. 
 125. See id. at 711. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See REVISED UNIF. AGENTS ACT (2015) [hereinafter RUAAA] (noting that the 
NCCUSL and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) designations are interchangeable as they 
refer to the same organization and that as of 2020 the NCCUSL was in its 128th year. The 
NCCUSL is comprised of legal experts from the academy and profession with goal of creating 
non-partisan legislation to clarify existing law and to create national uniform legal standards). 
 128. WEILER, supra note 123, at 711; SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 158 (“A 
clear majority of the states that have adopted the UAAA have done so without making any 
substantively significant variations to it.”). 
 129. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 158 (“Early on, the focus of uniform leg-
islation was on issues relating to recruitment, not agent quality control.”); WEILER supra note 
123, at 711-12. See Myers, supra note 29, at 75-76; see also Joshua Lens, Application of the 
UAAA, RUAAA, and State Athlete-Agent Laws to Corruption in Men’s College Basketball and 
Revisions Necessitated by NCAA Rule Changes, 30 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 47, 64 (2019). 
 130. Michael L. Martin, It’s Not a Foul Unless the Ref Blows the Whistle: How to Step 
Up Enforcement of the UAAA and SPARTA, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 209, 214 (2012). 
 131. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. § 7801(2) (2004) 
(defining “athlete-agent” as “an individual who enters into an agency contract with a student 
athlete, or directly or indirectly recruits or solicits a student athlete to enter into an agency 
contract, and does not include a spouse, parent, sibling, grandparent, or guardian of such stu-
dent athlete, or an individual acting solely on behalf of a professional sports team or profes-
sional sports organization”); UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 2(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) 
(The 2000 UAAA’s definition was materially identical); RUAAA, supra note 127, § 2(2) (ex-
panding this definition to include financial advisors and others.); see also Myers, supra note 
29, at 77. 
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state attorneys general.132  By 2012, the UAAA and SPARTA laws were 
rarely enforced despite continued agent misconduct.133 
In the following years, several states amended their athlete-agent 
acts to address perceived weaknesses and under-enforcement.134  The 
NCCUSL introduced the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act 
(RUAAA) in 2015 to preserve uniformity and modernize the UAAA.  As 
of 2019, fourteen states had enacted the RUAAA, and nine more intro-
duced it.135  The RUAAA is widely supported by collegiate athletic of-
ficials and coaches, as well as several prominent agents.136 
Like the UAAA, the RUAAA’s central focus is the “protection [of] 
student-athletes and educational institutions” who may suffer harm when 
an athlete agrees to agent representation and, as a result, loses his or her 
eligibility before it has expired.137  The RUAAA attempts to promote the 
protection of student-athletes in several ways.  First, the RUAAA created 
a simplified and uniform agent registration process and also added a goal 
of promoting information-sharing among state agent registration bod-
ies.138  Agents must register with the state, providing references and dis-
closing their formal training to be an agent, their practical experiences 
as an agent, and their education.139  The applicant must also disclose 
criminal convictions involving acts of moral turpitude and felonies, civil 
determinations of false or deceptive representations, applicant conduct 
that led to the imposition of sanctions on a student-athlete, and any dis-
ciplinary action against the agent.140 
Under the RUAAA, agents are prohibited from contacting student-
athletes unless the agents are registered and, as a way of promoting com-
pliance with the RUAAA, agent registration in one state entitles that 
agent to reciprocity in any other RUAAA state.141  Agent representation 
 
 132. Martin, supra note 130, at 214-15. See Myers, supra note 29, at 86 (proposing a “dual 
threat”—that individual institutions have standing to bring suit against bad agents along with 
the FTC for violating SPARTA, shifting some of the burden from the FTC while still allowing 
it to file an unfair trade practice claim; the NCAA would first file a claim with the FTC and if 
it elected not to pursue an unfair trade practice claim, then the NCAA could file suit). 
 133. See Martin, supra note 130, at 215. 
 134. Lens, supra note 129, at 65. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 65-66. 
 137. REVISED UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) [hereinafter 
RUAAA 2019]; see SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS supra note 121, at 159-62. 
 138. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 2-3; see also WEILER, supra note 123, at 711-12 
(“[Under the RUAAA,] agents must register with the state and disclose training, experience, 
. . . and any disciplinary action against the agent. . . and [t]he agent and/or student must notify 
the educational institution within 72 hours that a representation agreement has been signed.”). 
 139. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 159; WEILER, supra note 123, at 712. 
 140. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 121, at 160; WEILER, supra note 123, at 712. 
 141. WEILER, supra note 123, at 712. 
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agreements must be in writing, signed by both parties, with clear provi-
sions specifying compensation and the agent’s registration status.142  The 
RUAAA also broadens the definition of “athlete agent” to include finan-
cial and career advisors,143 requires student-athletes to sign a statement 
acknowledging that they may lose their amateur eligibility by entering 
into an agency contract, and provides the athlete with a fourteen day can-
cellation period.144  Agents cannot offer anything of value to the athlete 
in exchange for signing a representation agreement, and the “agent 
and/or the athlete must notify the educational institution within seventy-
two hours of the signing of a representation agreement.”145  The RUAAA 
gives student-athletes a right of action against agents who violate the act 
and provides criminal penalties for agents who encourage another to take 
action, which the act would prohibit the agent from taking.146 
The NCCUSL amended Section 14 of the RUAAA in 2019 to ac-
commodate the NCAA’s 2018 bylaw amendments implementing the 
Rice Commission’s recommendation that basketball players who declare 
for the NBA draft, but who are not drafted, should be able to return to 
college, finish their degree, and remain eligible for college basketball.147  
In addition, while the 2015 version of the RUAAA flatly prohibited an 
agent from “furnish[ing] anything of value to the athlete before the ath-
lete enters into [a sports agent] contract,”148 the 2019 RUAAA version 
permits it where the agent notifies the athletic director of the athlete’s 
institution and the athlete makes a recorded acknowledgment that receiv-
ing the “thing of value” may result in loss of the athlete’s eligibility.149  
The apparent purpose of this 2019 RUAAA amendment, consistent with 
2018 changes to the NCAA bylaws, is to allow agents to defray expenses 
related to the agent selection process even before the athlete has signed 
an agreement with the agent.150 
The various governmental regulatory regimes governing sports 
agents, such as SPARTA, are broad and comprehensive.  Although there 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 2. 
 144. WEILER, supra note 123, at 712. 
 145. Id. 
 146. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 2-3. 
 147. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.2.4.2.1; RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, at 1-3. 
 148. RUAAA 2019, supra note 137, § 14(2). 
 149. Id. § 14. 
 150. See id. §§ 14 cmt., 14(2); see also RUAAA, supra note 127, at 2-3 (explaining that 
NCAA bylaws amendments adopted August 8, 2018, “allowed for payments by sports agents 
to student-athletes and family members for meals, hotel, and travel in connection with recruit-
ing and signing the student-athlete as a client.”). Unlike the NCAA Bylaw, the RUAAA 
amendment on its face interestingly does not limit the payment of expenses to only the agent 
selection process. 
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is literature suggesting ways to improve these regimes,151 one might 
think nevertheless that the broad scope of these laws ensures adequate 
protection for student-athletes from agent misconduct, especially when 
considered in conjunction with the NCAA’s No Agent Rule.152  Unfor-
tunately, widespread under-enforcement of state and federal laws, and 
NCAA regulations, means that student-athletes are still vulnerable to 
agent misconduct.  “Only a handful of UAAA criminal cases have been 
brought under the UAAA.”153  An Associated Press study in 2010 
showed “that more than half of the 42 states that had enacted a version 
of the UAAA had failed . . . [to] impose any penalty on a sports agent,” 
let alone suspend or revoke an agent’s registration or license.154  The 
under-enforcement of existing agent laws may lead to broader disrespect 
and even encourage agents to violate other laws and rules.155  A regula-
tory regime’s effectiveness in punishing and deterring misconduct, no 
matter how well-crafted, is fatally undermined without a serious and ac-
tive commitment to regulatory enforcement and adequate or better 
 
 151. Jessop, supra note 29 (noting the inadequacy of the UAAA, SPARTA and the NCAA 
Division I Manual’s rules to protect student athletes’ interests from sports agents given the 
Gatto scandal and recommending a new model whereby “NCAA Division I FBS member 
institutions . . . each adopt and actively impose individual sports agent regulations[;]” educate 
NCAA athletes about the “role and requirements of sports agents[;]” and offer “member in-
stitutional-based incentives to sports agents” in return for agent compliance); Eric Willen-
bacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and State Efforts Do Not Deter the 
Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing System May Cure the Problem, 
78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225, 1233-53 (2004) (calling for a national registry and the licensure 
of sports agents and arguing that the threat of license revocation would deter agent miscon-
duct); Timothy G. Nelson, Flag on the Play: The Ineffectiveness of Athlete-Agent Law and 
Regulations—and How North Carolina Can Take Advantage of a Scandal to Be a Model for 
Reform, 90 N.C.L. REV. 800, 820-21 (2012) (“Despite the multiple means by which agents are 
regulated, the current regulatory scheme is general ineffective at preventing and deterring ath-
lete agents from engaging in improper behavior. The laws are rarely enforced, and when they 
are, punishments fail to adequately penalize violators enough to deter others from committing 
future violations.”). 
 152. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.1.2(g), which essentially bars an athlete 
from entering into an agent services agreement; and see also id. § 12.1.2(a)-(b), which also 
bars an athlete from receiving compensation or accepting a promise of payment related to 
athletic skill from an agent. 
 153. WEILER supra note 123, at 713. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Adver-
tising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
971, 1006 (2002) (expressing a similar concern about underenforced advertising rules in the 
legal profession an d concluding that this “breeds disrespect for professional regulation . . . 
[and] may encourage lawyers to violate or bend other professional rules.”); RICE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 2 (“Where an entire community is aware of substantial rule breaking and the 
governance body fails to act, the result is cynicism and contempt; and noting that all [NCAA 
stakeholders] expressed the belief that the current [infractions investigation and adjudication] 
system is not working in cases of serious violations.”). 
 
2020] THE NCAA’S “NO AGENT RULE” 29 
resources devoted to such enforcement.156  Both of these conditions for 
effective regulatory enforcement seem to be lacking given the dismal 
enforcement record against bad agents under RUAAA-based state laws 
and SPARTA.  Until there is effective enforcement of sports agent laws, 
student-athletes and NCAA member institutions will continue to be at 
risk of being harmed by agent misconduct, as poignantly illustrated in 
the recent case of United States v. Gatto.157 
IV. UNITED STATES V. GATTO AND THE RICE COMMISSION 
United States v. Gatto is a case about corruption in NCAA Division 
I Men’s College Basketball, a billion-dollar enterprise for the NCAA, 
prominent colleges and universities, and their coaches.158  In 2017 the 
University of Louisville’s team realized $29 million in revenue from 
men’s basketball alone.159  The Gatto case has been described as “[o]ne 
of the biggest stories in college sports . . . turn[ing] the men’s college 
basketball world upside down” because it detailed “a thriving black mar-
ket in which coaches, agents, financial advisors, and shoe and apparel 
company employees exploited naïve, young basketball student-ath-
letes.”160 
The trial judge in Gatto noted that “[a]t the root of this situation is 
the NCAA’s principle of amateurism”161—a principle that has attracted 
much criticism.162  Under the NCAA’s rules, only amateurs can compete 
 
 156. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 187 (1986) (noting that the regulation of 
other occupations, for example, the law profession, have experienced a similar dynamic where 
inadequate resources and/or the will to enforce an otherwise good regulatory scheme will fail 
to punish and deter future misconduct). 
 157. United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019). For prior history, see United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 
339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss a conspiracy indictment 
“among defendants, certain basketball coaches of the Universities of Louisville and Miami, 
and certain student basketball players and/or their families.”). 
 158. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *1-2. 
 159. Id. at *2; see James F. Reid, Call to the Bullpen: How the 2012 MLB Draft Shows 
Why the NCAA Must Make a Change to its Bylaws, 3 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 57, 78-79 
(2012) (noting that college sports is a $60 billion industry and that the NCAA received $711 
million for the 2011 television rights to the March Madness basketball tournament). 
 160. See Lens, supra note 129, at 50. 
 161. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *1-2 (reporting the court’s reasoning for par-
tially granting and partially denying the government’s motion to exclude the defendants’ ex-
pert testimony). 
 162. Id. at 3 (characterizing the NCAA’s amateurism rules as “long standing, [but] not 
free of controversy” and noting that “[s]ome have argued that [the amateurism rules] unfairly 
prevent student-athletes from sharing in the financial benefits generated by the basketball 
games they play.”); see, e.g., Reid, supra note 159 (discussing changes to the MLB’s 2012 
Draft rules that make it difficult for high school and college baseball student-athletes to assess 
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in intercollegiate athletics, and the difference between an amateur and a 
professional athlete is the receipt of a benefit or payment related to one’s 
athletic services.163  The student-athlete forfeits amateur eligibility if he 
or she accepts any form of payment directly or indirectly related to col-
legiate athletics that is not approved by the NCAA.164  In addition, any 
university or individual, such as a coach, found to have violated an 
NCAA rule “may be subject [to additional penalties], including limita-
tion on the school’s participation in post-season play . . . , limitations on 
the school’s funding from the NCAA, and various financial penalties.”165 
The Gatto story begins in 2015 when the FBI launched an investi-
gation to uncover bribery schemes involving Division I Men’s 
 
their market value and whether to sign a professional contract; further contending the NCAA 
should change its no-agent rule and allow agents to represent baseball players in negotiating 
with MLB teams and also change the composition of NCAA members’ Professional Sports 
Counseling Programs (PSCPs) to ensure student-athletes obtain the expertise to transition to 
professional baseball. “The NCAA’s purpose and its guiding principles behind amateurism 
have been under heavy criticism lately, especially considering the $60 billion industry that is 
college sports,” id. at 78). 
 163. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.2.10. The NCAA defines “pay” as the “receipt 
of funds, awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the Association for 
participation in athletics.” Id. 
 164. United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.2.11 (“[A professional athlete is] one who receives any kind of 
payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing 
legislation of the Association.”); see also Andrea C. Closa, Corruption and College Sports: A 
Love Story, 42 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 17, 20 (2020) (The NCAA defines “payment” 
as “the receipt of funds or awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the 
Association for participation in athletics[;]” currently, student-athletes may receive “actual 
and necessary expenses” that are directly-related to competition in the sport, including: lodg-
ing, meals, apparel, equipment, health insurance, and transportation.). 
 165. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 339; see Charles Riley, Penn State hit with severe financial 
penalties, CNN MONEY (July 23, 2012, 6:29 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/news/economy/penn-state-financial-penalties/index.htm 
(reporting that Penn State was fined $60 million by the NCAA and Big Ten conference after 
the school’s child abuse scandal); see also Associated Press, No. 12 Seton Hall Placed on 
Three Years’ Probation by NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 16, 2019), 
https://www.si.com/college/2019/11/16/seton-hall-placed-on-probation-by-ncaa (noting the 
NCAA fined Seton Hall $5,000 plus one percent of the men’s basketball budget for the 2020-
21 season resulting from a recruitment violation for a player that ultimately transferred to the 
university); see generally Collegiate athletics: Fair Pay to Play Act: Hearing on S.B. 206 
Before the Assemb. Comm. on Arts, Ent., Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media, cmt. 5 (2019-
2020) (June 25, 2019) (reporting University of Southern California’s (USC) “opposition[al] 
concerns” to the state’s “Fair Pay to Play Act” or SB 206 and noting, in part, a concern that 
any reforms be addressed at a national level through the NCAA because state approved law 
reforms would place schools in those states at a competitive disadvantage with other national 
programs; further warning that “SB 206 would encourage students to violate the NCAA by-
laws, [making them] ineligible and putting athletic teams and athletic departments at risk” and 
noting that in 2010, because two USC athletes “violated NCAA rules by accepting compen-
sation from sports agents[,]” the USC athletic program “received some of the harshest penal-
ties ever handed down to a Division I program.”). 
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Basketball.166  This investigation prompted the United States Attorney’s 
Office in the Southern District of New York to announce on September 
26, 2017 the arrest of ten persons including agents, coaches, and apparel 
company employees alleging a “pay for play” bribe scandal involving 
upcoming Division I Basketball players and their families.167  The “pay 
for play” bribery scheme violated the NCAA’s longstanding amateurism 
rule that prohibits student-athletes and/or their families from receiving 
impermissible payments or other benefits to play basketball at a particu-
lar university.168  Both the arrest announcement as well as the underlying 
investigation surprised NCAA President Emmert and others,169 although 
the “dirty little secret” about corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball 
was known to many associated with the sport.170 
Among those indicted were Adidas executive, James Gatto, Adidas 
consultant, Merl Code, and aspiring sports agent, Christian Dawkins.171  
They were charged criminally with committing and conspiring to com-
mit wire fraud resulting from the alleged funneling of high school bas-
ketball players into Adidas-sponsored Division I programs.172  They 
were not charged with violating any sports agent law, such as SPARTA, 
underscoring the concern in Part III of this article about the under-en-
forcement of laws regulating sports agents.173 
 
 166. United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019). 
 167. Lens, supra note 129, at 51 (noting that the FBI multiyear investigation revealed two 
related schemes, a “Coach Bribery Scheme” and the “Adidas Scheme.”); see Gatto, 295 F. 
Supp. 3d at 339-40. 
 168. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901 at *2; see Lens, supra note 129, at 50-61 (dis-
cussing the adjudication of each defendants’ alleged offense and sanction). 
 169. Matt Norlander, Ultimate college basketball corruption scandal primer: Explaining 
the latest with the FBI probe, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2018, 3:16 PM), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/ultimate-college-basketball-corruption-
scandal-primer-explaining-the-latest-with-the-fbi-probe/ (reporting, in part, that the FBI 
Gatto investigation began with the Securities and Exchange Commission charging financial 
advisor Matt Blazer with fraud who then informed the government that he could show fraud 
and corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball recruiting); see also Lens, supra note 129, at 
75-76. 
 170. The Rice Commission Report’s Introduction underscored the widespread knowledge 
regarding corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball stating, “The fact remains, however, that 
today’s issues have been around a long time, and their existence is widely acknowledged. 
Virtually all stakeholders and others providing information to the Commission at some point 
uttered the discouraging phrase: ‘Everyone knows what’s been going on.’ ”  RICE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 16. 
 171. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 339. 
 172. Gatto, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *4. 
 173. Jessop, supra note 29, at 199 (“Notably, none of the 10 individuals charged amidst 
the FBI’s three-year investigation into alleged corruption and bribery . . . were charged with 
violating state or federal statutes related to sports agents.”) (citing U.S. Attorney Announces 
The Arrest Of 10 Individuals, Including Four Division I Coaches, For College Basketball 
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The Gatto defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment.174  They argued at trial that the prosecution improperly utilized the 
criminal mail and wire fraud statute to punish those who “cheated” a 
private association, the NCAA, by violating its amateurism rules.  Stated 
differently, violating an NCAA rule does not mean one also has violated 
the law.175  In addition, the defendants claimed they actually helped, ra-
ther than harmed, the universities by bringing them top high school re-
cruits and by providing financial assistance to the poor and underprivi-
leged families of student-athletes.176  The defendants further claimed that 
because they never sought money from the universities, they received no 
benefit and thus could not have committed fraud against the universi-
ties.177  The defendants also argued the fraud charge was improper be-
cause college basketball coaches implicitly asked Adidas to help the stu-
dent-athletes’ families financially.178 
The prosecution argued that a defendant does not need to obtain 
money or property to violate the mail and wire fraud statutes; property 
can include “ ‘ intangible interests such as the right to control the use of 
one’s assets.’ ” 179  By casting the universities as victims of the fraudulent 
scheme, the prosecution narrowed in on the defendants’ interference 
with the right of such universities to control their assets, the so-called 
“right to control” theory.180  Prosecutors argued that the defendants’ ac-
tions rendered the recruits ineligible to play college basketball, and the 
 
Fraud And Corruption Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/usao-sdny/video/us-attorney-announces-arrest-10-individuals-including-four-divi-
sion-i-coaches) (providing details of the FBI’s investigation in Gatto and charges against the 
ten individuals); see supra Part III Section B, Regulating Sports Agents: The Uniform Athlete 
Agents Act (UAAA) and Similar Rules. 
 174. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 338 (providing the written opinion explaining the court’s 
earlier denial in open court on February 15, 2018 denying the defendants’ joint motion to 
dismiss the indictment). 
 175. Id. at 350. 
 176. Id. at 342. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (citing United States v. Finazzo, 850 F.3d 94, 108 (2d 
Cir. 2017)). The prosecution relied on precedent in the Second Circuit to argue that the de-
fendant does not need to obtain the money to violate mail and wire statutes. Id. at 345-46 
(holding that “in the Second Circuit one may be convicted of wire fraud without the victim 
being ‘out of pocket’ to the defendant” thus this indictment, “adequately charges a conspiracy 
to use the wires in furtherance of a scheme by which student-athletes and/or their families—
alleged co-conspirators all—would obtain athletic scholarships, thereby depriving the victims 
of money or other property.” Id. at 346 n.56) (citing, in part, Finazzo, 850 F.3d at 108-11, as 
endorsing the “right to control theory” and “explicitly [holding] that the deprivation of the 
right to control one’s assets can serve as a basis for criminal liability under the mail and wire 
fraud statutes.”). 
 180. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 346. 
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additional acts of concealment basically scammed the universities into 
doling out scholarships to ineligible players, exposing the universities to 
economic harm.181  According to the prosecution’s theory, a defendant 
only needs to interfere with a victim’s property rights under the mail and 
wire fraud statutes.182 
The Gatto court agreed with the prosecution and refused to dismiss 
the indictment, finding that the indictment “adequately charges a con-
spiracy to use the wires in furtherance of a scheme by which student-
athletes and/or their families . . . would obtain athlete scholarships, 
thereby [interfering with or] depriving the victims of money or other 
property.”183  The court stated that “it should surprise no one that know-
ingly making a false representation in order to get financial aid from a 
university could give rise to criminal liability.”184 
After a three-week trial and two days of jury deliberation, the jury 
unanimously convicted the defendants of wire fraud, finding that defend-
ants had (a) made payments to families of prospective student-athletes 
to induce those student-athletes to attend particular NCAA Division I 
universities; and (b) caused those student-athletes to submit certifica-
tions to the universities falsely stating that they were compliant with 
NCAA rules—essentially that they were amateurs.185  Gatto was sen-
tenced to nine months, and Merl and Dawkins were each sentenced to 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. The indictment  
alleges also that defendants and their co-conspirators conspired to ‘defraud[] the 
universities . . . by depriving the universities of significant and necessary infor-
mation regarding the non-compliance with NCAA rules by the relevant student-
athletes and coaches,’ thereby: ‘[I]nterfer[ing] with the universities’ ability to con-
trol their assets and creat[ing] a risk of tangible economic harm to the universities, 
including, among other things, decision-making about the distribution of their lim-
ited athletic scholarships; the possible disgorgement of certain profit-sharing by the 
NCAA; monetary fines; restrictions on athlete recruitment and the distribution of 
athletic scholarships; and the potential ineligibility of the universities’ basketball 
teams to compete in NCAA programs generally, and the ineligibility of certain stu-
dent-athletes in particular. 
Id. (citing Indictment ¶ 3). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 350. 
 185. See Lens, supra note 129, at 48, 59-60; see also Will Hobson & Kevin Armstrong, 
All Three Defendants Found Guilty of Wire Fraud in College Basketball Corruption Trial, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2018) (reporting “two Adidas officials and an aspiring NBA agent were 
found guilty of fraud charges” after a three-year investigation of college basketball, and writ-
ing “the jury embraced the government’s theory that, by paying the families of five top recruits 
amounts ranging from $2,500 to $90,000, in violation of NCAA rules, the men defrauded 
Louisville, Kansas and North Carolina State. The schools would not have awarded scholar-
ships to those recruits if they had known about the illicit payments, prosecutors argued, and 
now face possible NCAA sanctions and financial penalties as a result.”). 
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six months in federal prison in order to send a “great big warning light 
to the basketball world.”186 
A. The Rice Commission—“Everyone knows what’s been going on.”187 
The public notoriety and related outrage surrounding the Gatto 
scandal forced the NCAA to take quick and public action to address the 
corruption in Division I Men’s Basketball.  Shortly after the announce-
ment of the charges, NCAA President, Mark Emmert, stated on October 
11, 2017, that it is “very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive 
changes to the way we operate, and [to] do so quickly.”188  He further 
stated, “[w]hile I believe the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, 
the culture of silence in college basketball enables bad actors, and we 
need them out of the game.  We must take decisive action. This is not a 
time for half-measures or incremental change.”189 
As a first and familiar step in the NCAA’s crisis management play-
book,190 Emmert announced that the NCAA Board of Governors, the Di-
vision I Board of Directors, and the NCAA President were appointing a 
Blue-Ribbon Commission, the Commission on College Basketball, or 
commonly known as the Rice Commission after its chair, Dr. Con-
doleezza Rice.191  The Rice Commission’s members included a nation-
ally prominent group of experts hailing from academia, athletic depart-
ments, professional basketball, and private industry.192 
 
 186. Lens, supra note 129, at 59; see United States v. Gatto, No. 17-cr-0686 (LAK), 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019) (“All [three] defendants were 
charged with and convicted on one count of participating in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud 
and one count of wire fraud in connection with an alleged scheme to defraud the University 
of Louisville. Defendant James Gatto alone was charged with and convicted of one additional 
count of wire fraud in connection with an alleged scheme to defraud the University of Kan-
sas.”); see also Redacted Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 14, United States v. Gatto, 295 
F. Supp. 3d (2d. Cir. Aug. 8, 2019) (No. 19-0783, 0786, 0788). 
 187. This quote is a sobering, if not deeply disturbing, prefatory statement in the Rice 
Report’s Introduction. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 16; see also infra note 169. The Com-
mission further stated, “Virtually all stakeholders and others providing information to the 
Commission at some point uttered this discouraging phrase.” RICE REPORT, supra note 14, 
at 16 (emphasis added). 
 188. Statement from President Mark Emmert on the Formation of a Commission on Col-
lege Basketball, NCAA (Oct. 11, 2017, 1:55 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/me-
dia-center/news/statement-president-mark-emmert-formation-commission-college-basket-
ball. 
 189. Id.; see also RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15. 
 190. See Branch, supra note 2 (discussing, in part, collegiate athletic scandals and three 
NCAA Knight Commissions Reports, the first occurring in 1991, that addressed corruption 
and commercialism in college sports and calling for more control by college presidents). 
 191. For a list of the Rice Commission’s distinguished members, see infra note 192. 
 192. Dr. Condoleezza Rice chaired the blue ribbon commission; its members included 
Mary Sue Coleman, President, Association of American Universities; General Martin E. 
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The Rice Commission’s mandate was clear and broad: “ ‘ examin[e] 
critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working’ and [to] focus on 
three areas.”193  The first area was to examine “[t]he relationship between 
the NCAA national office, its members, their student-athletes and 
coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, non-scholastic 
basketball and athlete agents and advisors.”194  The Rice Commission’s 
charge—to examine the relationship between “athlete agents and advi-
sors” with the NCAA and others, apparel companies, for example—sig-
naled a potential seismic shift in the landscape of intercollegiate athlet-
ics.  This article discusses only the Rice Commission’s examination and 
recommendations concerning the NCAA’s relationship with “athlete 
agents and advisors” that was part of the Commission’s first focus 
area.195 
The Rice Commission’s initial key task consisted of “gathering in-
formation and expert opinions for making ‘transformative recommenda-
tions’” to the Division I Board of Directors and NCAA Board of Gover-
nors “on legislation, policies, actions, and structure(s) to protect the 
integrity of college sports, with a focus on Division I Men’s Basket-
ball.”196  The Rice Commission highlighted an important, albeit unpleas-
ant, fact at the outset of its report.  Based on “virtually all” of the persons 
the Rice Commission heard from, it recognized that “the challenges 
identified in this report have been part of the landscape of pre-profes-
sional basketball for many years, and that others have previously made 
serious efforts to address them with only limited success.”197  The Rice 
 
Dempsey, U.S. Army Retired, Chairman, USA Basketball; Jeremy Foley, Athletics Director 
Emeritus, University of Florida Athletic Association; Jeffrey Hathaway; Vice President/Di-
rector of Athletics, Hofstra University; Grant Hill, Owner/Vice Chairman, Atlanta Hawks; 
Rev. John I Jenkins, C.S.C., President of University of Notre Dame; Mike Montgomery, Re-
tired Basketball Coach, Analyst, PAC-12 Networks; David Robinson, Founder, Admiral Cap-
ital Group; Kathryn Ruemmler, Former White House Counsel, Partner, Latham & Watkins 
LLP; Gene Smith, Sr., Vice President and Wolfe Foundation Endowed Athletics Director, 
Ohio State University and John Thompson III, Board of Directors, National Association of 
Basketball Coaches. Members were appointed for an initial six-month term with the expecta-
tion that they would provide the NCAA Boards with a report for their April 18, 2018 meetings. 
RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15-16. 
 193. Id. at 15. This article focuses on the first area. The remaining two areas are beyond 
this article’s scope. For a description of the other two focus areas, see infra note 194. 
 194. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 15 (emphasis added). The Rice Commission’s sec-
ond focus area concerned the “relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the 
challenging effect of the NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one and done 
phenomenon in men’s college basketball.” Id. The final focus area asked the Commission to 
consider the “creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions and 
its national office to promote transparency and accountability.” Id. 
 195. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. 
 196. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 16. 
 197. Id. 
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Commission emphasized that “these challenges have become more 
prominent in the past decade as elite basketball–pre-college, in-college 
and post-college–has become exponentially more lucrative.”198  In short, 
the Rice Commission grasped the enormous difficulty it faced in trans-
forming the pre-professional basketball culture to protect the integrity of 
intercollegiate athletics.199 
The Commission heard from a variety of stakeholders and others, 
even opening a portal and soliciting public input.200  For example, the 
Commission heard directly from the NBA, the National Basketball Play-
ers Association (NBPA), USA Basketball, numerous NCAA offices and 
departments, athletic conferences, apparel companies, agents, college 
and high school coaches associations, student and faculty associations, 
athletic directors’ associations, other interested associations and groups, 
the Uniform Law Commission, athletes, and other individuals.201 
The Commission devoted considerable attention to the question re-
garding the appropriate role of agents and whether agents should have 
access to athletes.202  The Rice Commission noted that NCAA rules bar 
students and/or their family members and other representatives from en-
tering into any oral or written contracts on the athlete’s behalf for “pur-
poses of marketing their athletic ability or reputation for financial gain, 
 
 198. Id.(“Everyone knows what’s been going on.”). 
 199. Id. at 1. The Rice Report concluded  
[i]t has taken some time to get here, and it will take time to change course.  The 
Commission offers it recommendations knowing that the road ahead is long–but 
that the first steps must be . . . bold . . . . The indictments handed down by the Justice 
Department and the ongoing FBI investigation spurred the NCAA to ask for this 
report. [R]adical changes are long overdue. We the commissioners believe that this 
is a final opportunity to turn the course of college basketball in the right direction. 
Id. 
 200. Id. at 17. 
 201. Id. 
 202. The Rice Commission’s discussion about agents occurs in the following sections of 
its report. See RICE REPORT supra note 14. 
1) Executive Summary of Recommendations § 1: Realistic Pathways for Student-Ath-
letic Success, C. Permit Students to Receive Meaningful Assessment of Profes-
sional Prospects Earlier with Assistance From Certified Agents. Id. at 6-7; 
2) Report of the Commission, Summary Identification of the Issues, B.2. Substance, 
Including Penalties, ¶ Agents. Id. at 23-24; 
3) Report of the Commission, Recommendations § 1: Realistic Pathways for Student-
Athletic Success, C. Permit Students to Receive Meaningful Assessment of Profes-
sional Prospects Earlier with Assistance from Certified Agents. Id. at 33-35. 
It identified and discussed the issue or topic of agents and advisors after first considering the 
NCAA’s “Amateurism” principle and underscoring the close connection between the two top-
ics. 
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even if that agreement is limited to future representation.”203  The 
NCAA’s longstanding concern about agents having access to student-
athletes and the threat it poses to the NCAA’s amateurism principle is 
poignantly illustrated by its ban on student-athletes receiving any bene-
fits “from agents even [when] those benefits do not have strings visibly 
attached.”204 
NCAA stakeholders testifying before the Commission essentially 
reflected three schools of thought regarding agents’ access to athletes.  
One school of thought argued that agents should have early access to 
athletes at the beginning of each college academic year and perhaps as 
early as high school.205  They believed athletes and their families lacked 
sufficient knowledge about collegiate, post-collegiate, and professional 
options to allow them to develop a “path for success.”206  This knowledge 
deficiency, and the tendency of athletes and their families to misjudge 
the athlete’s professional prospects, hamper their ability to develop the 
best plan for advancing the athlete’s interests.207 
The Commission noted that many elite high school and college bas-
ketball players believe they will play professional basketball, but the data 
suggests that belief is unfounded.208  Only approximately one and two-
tenths percent of men’s basketball players advance to the NBA, the most 
prized professional basketball league.209  Nevertheless, a Rice Commis-
sion study showed that fifty-nine percent of Division I players expect to 
play professional basketball.210  Even more striking is additional NCAA 
research that shows seventy-six percent of Division I, forty-eight percent 
of Division II, and twenty-one percent of Division III basketball players 
think “they have a chance to play at the next level.”211  Such expectations 
of playing at the “next level” are simply unwarranted given existing data. 
 
 203. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23 (“Prohibited marketing includes negotiations with 
professional teams, seeking product endorsements, and efforts to place an athlete at a partic-
ular school.”). 
 204. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 12.3.1, 12.3.1.2, 12.2.1, 12.3.3, 
12.3.1.3). 
 205. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 5. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 (citing So, you’re telling me there’s a chance…, 
NCAA (Dec. 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/so-you-re-telling-me-
there-s-chance). Immediately following these percentages in the Rice Report, the Commission 
opines: 
[E]rroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind of misjudgment that should 
deprive student-athletes of the valuable opportunity to enter college or to continue 
in college while playing basketball. While this rule change may inconvenience 
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Some stakeholders offered a second school of thought about agents.  
They contended that agents are determined to contact prospects and per-
sons who may influence them and that agents will find ways to circum-
vent NCAA restrictions on such athlete-agent contact.212  After all, an 
agent’s recruitment of a top athletic prospect is a long, complex under-
taking fraught with surprises, disappointment, and no guarantees of suc-
cess, much like participating in the grueling Alaska Iditarod Sled Dog 
Race.213  Agents are always looking for some advantage over competi-
tors to land such elite talent.  Indeed, this group of stakeholders told the 
Rice Commission that they believe that agents are already contacting 
elite high school and collegiate players to gain a competitive advantage 
in representing them.214 
The third school of thought, embraced by some agents, believes that 
allowing agents to contact high school athletes will enable agents to help 
with important decisions at an even earlier stage in the athlete’s decision 
making.215  For example, the agent would presumably advise the athlete 
about the selection of a non-scholastic coach, such as an academy or club 
level coach; which high school to attend; which “showcase” tournaments 
to play in; and which brand of equipment and apparel to use, such as, 
Nike, Adidas, or Under Armour.216  These stakeholders advocate for 
higher “barriers to entry” for professional agents seeking access to stu-
dent-athletes.217  A more stringent certification process would ensure 
agents are competent and possess the requisite good character to serve 
 
coaches seeking to set their rosters for the following season, we conclude that the 
student-athlete’s interest should govern here. A player chagrined to discover that he 
lacks an NBA future may grow into his collegiate experience and adopt a different 
plan of the future. 
The Commission concludes “[i]n sum, student-athletes should have more information about 
their professional prospects and more flexibility to test those prospects and return to school. 
This change and other related changes should make it easier for them to do so without losing 
their collegiate eligibility.” Id. at 6. 
 212. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23-24. 
 213. See also JERRY MAGUIRE (Gracie Films 1996) (chronicling Maguire’s rise to becom-
ing a successful agent and noting that at one point Maguire had so many clients he could 
barely keep track of them; and showing how Maguire spent almost 100 percent of his time on 
the road travelling to recruit athletes and make lucrative deals). Sports agent Jerry Maguire, 
played by Tom Cruise, was at the height of his career where he had so many clients that he 
did not care about any of them. Maguire was a road warrior spending most of his time travel-
ling for deals. Maguire is fired by his firm when he pens a letter to his office saying agents 
should care more about their clients than they do about the money. Upon his termination, only 
one client (a baseball player) stayed with him. See id. 
 214. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23-24. 
 215. Id. at 24. 
 216. Id. (“recognizing that the NBPA has recently taken important steps to improve the 
quality of the agent cadre”). 
 217. Id. 
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as fiduciaries for student-athletes.218  This group of stakeholders calls for 
higher penalties for agents who violate NCAA rules, either through en-
forcement of state and other laws or by reporting violations to the 
NBPA.219 
The Rice Commission accepted the collegiate model of athletics as 
the premise for making its reform recommendations.220  The key purpose 
of that model, according to the NCAA, “is to maintain intercollegiate 
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as 
an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line 
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”221  Member institutions are responsible for ensuring that their 
athletic programs comport with NCAA rules, including the No Agent 
Rule, that are designed to implement the NCAA’s basic purpose of keep-
ing collegiate athletics non-professional.222  The NCAA’s longstanding 
commitment to the principle of amateurism is the cornerstone of its lu-
crative business model, and agents have been viewed historically as a 
threat to that fundamental principle.  Thus, the Commission’s recom-
mendations were designed with the stated goal of supporting and fur-
thering the NCAA’s basic purpose of maintaining amateurism and also 
encouraging its members to accept responsibility for achieving that pur-
pose.223 
The Rice Commission recommended that the NCAA permit stu-
dents to receive a meaningful assessment of their professional prospects 
with the assistance of certified agents at an earlier time in their decision 
making process.224  This recommendation is clearly premised on the 
NCAA and its member institutions adopting a certification process for 
agents with “strict standards” that would warrant their earlier contact 
with student-athletes.225  The NCAA and member institutions would be 
 
 218. Id. at 33. Although the precise contours of any certification regime for agents is be-
yond the scope of this article, that regime should require that there be clear and convincing 
evidence of a violation before sanctioning an agent. This intermediate evidentiary standard of 
proof takes into consideration the significant property and other interests that an agent has in 
providing such services and the need to protect the athlete and public from bad agents. Cf. 
MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 18.3 (establishing the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard as the basis for sanctioning or disciplining lawyers for violating profes-
sional responsibility norms in the legal services field). 
 219. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 24. 
 220. Id. at 28. 
 221. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1). 
 222. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.1.1). 
 223. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, §§ 2.1.1, 2.2 1). 
 224. Id. at 3. The precise wording of the Recommendation follows: § 1: “Realistic Path-
ways for Student-Athlete Success,” C. “Permit Students to Receive Meaningful Assessment 
of Professional Prospects Earlier With Assistance From Certified Agents.”Id. 
 225. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 33. 
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authorized to allow “certified agents to engage with student-athletes at 
school at specific times during the calendar year.”226  Not surprisingly, 
the Commission noted that the NCAA “must appoint a Vice-President 
level executive to develop detailed [NCAA certification standards] and 
[to] administer the program.”227  In addition, the NCAA “should also 
educate elite [basketball players] about NCAA eligibility rules . . . [and 
their] professional prospects.”228 
The Commission noted that currently, student-athletes may retain 
lawyers and advisors to obtain professional services provided they do 
not perform the representational activities of agents, namely negotiating 
directly with colleges or professional teams to obtain a benefit or pay-
ment related to the student’s athletic services or reputation.229  The Com-
mission also recommended that “high school players considering enter-
ing the draft should be allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and 
advisors just as high school baseball players may engage agents for ad-
vice about the draft.”230  The Commission learned that agents or their 
associates are sometimes directly or indirectly paying many elite athletes 
and/or their families as early as their sophomore year in high school.231  
Current NCAA rules prohibit this practice and also bar players and their 
families from orally or in writing agreeing to be represented by an 
agent.232  “Virtually all agents” who spoke to the Commission advised it 
not to allow high school or college athletes or their families to enter into 
agreements with agents in advance of their professional careers—such a 
practice would increase the influence of corrupt agents.233  Nevertheless, 
these agents argued that the NCAA should allow “good” agents “to talk 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. at 34. 
 230. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.3.1.1). 
 231. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34. 
 232. Id.; see Walters & Bloom v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding 
that an agreement entered into by running back Brent Fullwood with a sports agency during 
the football season of his senior year of college for representation rights at the NFL draft was 
unenforceable as the agreement violated public policy because Fullwood signed the agreement 
before becoming eligible to sign). 
 233. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34. Contrary to the advice of these agents, the Rice 
Commission ultimately recommended that elite Division I Men’s Basketball and high school 
players “should be allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and advisors . . . for advice 
about the draft.” Id. The Commission presumably determined that athletes’ “desperate” need 
for such agent access and information about the draft and more outweighed these agents’ con-
cerns about the influence of corrupt agents. See id. In addition, the Rice Commission ad-
dressed this concern about “corrupt agents” by “recommend[ing] serious consequences,” in-
cluding decertification, for agents who violated acceptable agent representation rules. Id. at 
35, 43. 
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with high school and collegiate players [to] make their cases so that play-
ers would have all available options before . . . [entering] the profes-
sional market.”234  The Commission agreed and directed the NCAA cer-
tification program to offer such opportunities for “good” agents.235 
The Rice Commission’s recommendations about agents reflects its 
finding that athletes misjudge their professional prospects.  The Com-
mission concluded that high school and college athletes should be per-
mitted to contact NCAA certified agents to avoid any misunderstanding 
about their prospects.236  The families of these athletes also should be 
permitted to obtain objective, credible evidence about their athlete’s pro-
fessional prospects from agents.237  All students and their families “need 
timely, reliable and trusted sources of information about their likelihood 
of professional success.”238  The Commission recommended that the 
NCAA should bring into the light all discussions between certified-
agents and elite student basketball players concerning their professional 
prospects.239  This recommendation would help ensure that “good” 
agents feel safe in communicating with and providing desperately 
needed information to student-athletes about their professional and other 
prospects.240 
V. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE—OPENING ACCESS TO 
SPORTS AGENTS FOR ALL STUDENT-ATHLETES 
Student-athletes, most of whom are adolescents, constitute a special 
population on most university campuses with unique challenges and 
needs that differ from their non-athlete peers.241  In particular, student-
athletes devote considerable time and effort to athletics, not just to their 
 
 234. Id. at 34. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Joy Gaston Gayles, The Student Athlete Experience, 144 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL RES. 33 (Dec. 2009), https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/229574190_The_student_athlete_experience. The term adolescence generally describes 
the transitional period from childhood to adulthood (ages ten to twenty-four years)—a “de-
velopmental epoch during which children become adults intellectually, physically, hormo-
nally, and socially.” Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 449 (2013) [hereinafter Arain]. Medical and 
other experts report that this is a “tumultuous time, full of changes and transformation.” Id. 
Most collegiate student athletes are adolescents. “Brain maturation” during this time may be 
influenced by several factors, for example, “heredity, environment . . . nutritional status . . . 
physical, mental, economical, and psychological stress; drug abuse (caffeine, nicotine, and 
alcohol) and sex hormones . . . .” Id. at 450. 
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academics and future employment prospects.242  Such devotion 
prompted one expert to conclude, “[b]alancing the combination of the 
time commitment of intercollegiate athletics, the academic expectations, 
and the avenues of social relationships, student-athletes are presented 
with a level of transitional stress that no other students have to face 
. . . .”243  Another group of psychologists and sports experts similarly 
noted, 
[a]lthough there is variability from school to school, sport to sport, 
and time of year, the unique physical and psycho-social demands of 
often year-round training, competition, travel, and increasing pres-
sure to perform academically can compromise their health status 
more than others . . . . In view of similar lifestyle concerns and other 
issues (e.g., social isolation, identity conflicts, career-vocational is-
sues, fear of failure and success) . . . [these experts] suggested that 
student-athletes represent a population that is probably ‘at risk’ to 
 
 242. Gayles, supra note 241, at 33. See Provencio, supra note 19, at 4. “[B]etween 11% 
and 23% of student-athletes had paying jobs in addition to school and athletics” according to 
the 2015 GOALS Study. Id. at 7. 
The percentage of Division I athletes with jobs were FBS football players at 23%. 
The average hours per week worked rose from 8.1 hours per week in 2010 to 8.8 
hours per week in 2015.  Among Division I athletes 36% of men and 40% of women 
reported that they would like to spend more time working at a job. 
Id. See also Edward F. Etzel et al., Understanding and Promoting College Student-Ath-
lete Health: Essential Issues for Student Affairs Professionals, 43 NASPA J. 518, 521 
(2006) [hereinafter Etzel]. “Under the regular close scrutiny of coaches, compliance of-
ficers, the media, and influential others, student athletes must somehow learn how to 
balance the numerous demands and expectations of school, sports, and social and per-
sonal development on a daily basis.” Id. 
 243. See Joseph P. Williams, The Influence of the Components of Psychosocial Mentoring 
on the Academic, Athletic, and Social Outcomes of Male Student Athletes (Sept. 2017) (un-
published Ed.D. dissertation, Northcentral University), 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1964266641?pq-origsite-%20gschola (noting 
“[s]tudent-athletes may benefit from positive mentoring relationships” and discussing the ath-
lete’s coach as such a mentor; stating that “[a] mentor assists the protégé by providing support, 
direction, and counsel as he or she achieves this task”). It is important to note that “[a] sub-
stantial body of research suggested that college student-athletes may be at-risk for develop-
mental obstacles, in addition to facing the same developmental challenges that their non-ath-
letes peers do.” Id. See also Etzel, supra note 242. 
Despite the fact that student athletes confront the same long-standing developmental 
tasks of other college-age students (e.g., becoming independent, finding a sense of 
purpose, coping with uncertainty, dealing with authority, clarifying values) . . . it is 
clear that on top of their developmental challenges, athlete lifestyles, competitive 
pressures, and daily experiences are quite unlike those of their nonathlete peers. 
Id. at 520. “Others have observed that considerable numbers of [student-athletes] suffer 
from clinical mental health problems that warrant professional attention.” Id. at 521. 
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experience a range of distressful reactions linked to general health 
and mental health.244 
The NCAA Growth, Opportunities, Aspirations, and Learning of 
Students (GOALS) in College Survey periodically collects information 
from student-athletes to enable NCAA committees, policymakers, and 
member institutions to better understand student-athletes.245  The 
GOALS College Survey in 2016 revealed that student-athletes, both men 
and women and across all divisions, spent more time on athletic pursuits 
than the last GOALS survey in 2010.246  For example, the median time 
devoted to Division I athletics rose from thirty-two hours per week in 
season in 2010 to thirty-four hours per week in season in 2015.247  “FBS 
football players . . . report[ed] the highest weekly in-season time com-
mitments [with a] median 42 hours per week, up from 39 hours in 
2010[].”248  Two-thirds of Division I and II student-athletes spent at least 
as much or more time offseason on athletics as during the competitive 
season.249 
Beside the challenge of committing a large amount of time to ath-
letics, student-athlete success in sports, academics, and a career, may be 
further complicated because of sports-related personal injuries,250 
 
 244. See Etzel, supra note 242, at 521 (reporting that an investigation into various aspects 
of student-athlete health found “that alcohol, dysfunctional eating behaviors and related clin-
ical issues (e.g., eating disorders), coping with injury, keeping up with academics, and general 
stress were prominent health-related problems that point to the need for comprehensive 
healthcare planning and services for this group”). 
 245. NCAA GOALS Study of the Student-Athlete Experience Initial Summary of Findings 
January 2016, NCAA (Jan. 2016), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/GOALS_2015_summary_jan2016_final_20160627.pdf [hereinafter NCAA 
GOALS]. See Provencio, supra note 19, at 5-6. The NCAA GOALS is a survey study con-
cerning various matters that affect a student-athlete, for example, one’s athletic and academic 
experience, recruiting, finances and time commitments. The GOALS survey occurred in 2006, 
2010 and 2015. Id. at 24. 
 246. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2. 
 247. Id. (noting that the median time spent on Division II athletics increased from thirty 
hours per week in season in 2010 to thirty-two hours per week in season in 2015 and for 
Division III the median time increased from twenty hours per week in season in 2010 to 
twenty-eight and a half hours per week in season in 2015). 
 248. Id. (reporting that FCS football and Division I baseball spend forty or more hours per 
week and, among women’s sports, Division I softball registered the highest weekly figure at 
thirty hours). 
 249. Id. (revealing that at least seventy-five percent of Division I and II student athletes 
in baseball, football, and men’s and women’s track spend as much time off season in their 
sport as in-season). 
 250. See Etzel, supra note 242, at 521 (highlighting student-athlete injuries and stating 
that “coping with injury, keeping up with academics, and general stress were prominent 
health-related problems . . . .”). 
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fatigue, and even missed classes when their sport is in season.251  “Ap-
proximately one-third of student athletes . . . noted struggling to find en-
ergy for other tasks because of the physical demands of their sport.”252  
Almost one-quarter of the student-athletes surveyed reported being ex-
hausted from the mental demands of their sport and approximately thirty 
percent reported feeling “intractably overwhelmed during the past 
month,” representing an increase over the 2010 GOALS Study.253  Per-
haps even more unsettling, given the arduous schedule and highly struc-
tured environment of student-athletes, is the GOALS finding that “nearly 
two-thirds of men and three-quarters of women . . . expressed a prefer-
ence for more opportunities to visit home and family.”254  Similarly, a 
“high percentage” of survey participants desired more time for sociali-
zation and relaxation, especially among student-athletes with a high 
combination of academic and athletic time commitments.255  “The me-
dian self-reported weekly time spent socializing/relaxing during the ath-
letic season was 17.1 hours in 2015, down from 19.5 hours in 2010 
. . . .”256 
In short, the GOALS Study and other literature reflect the formida-
ble time management and health challenges confronting the relatively 
small, unique, and vulnerable student-athlete population.  Agents can 
help mitigate some of these challenges and related concerns, causing 
 
 251. Gayles, supra note 241 (reporting student athletes “miss a fair number of classes 
when their sport is in season”). Cf. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2 (“Although time 
spent on athletics has increased, 2015 reports of missed classes were generally low and very 
similar to those seen in 2010.”). 
 252. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 5 (highlighting that the percentage of student-
athletes struggling to find sufficient energy is higher in Division I and in some sports like 
football). 
 253. Id. at 4-5. See Etzel, supra note 242, at 521. 
In view of similar lifestyle concerns and other issues (e.g., social isolation, identity 
conflicts, career-vocational issues, fear of failure and success), psychologists Pink-
erton, Hinz, and Barrow (1989) suggested that student athletes represent a popula-
tion that is probably ‘at risk’ to experience a range of distressful reactions linked to 
general health and mental health. 
Id. For example, studies consistently show “that excessive alcohol consumption and neg-
ative alcohol-related consequences and behaviors are major health issues among college 
students and that intercollegiate athletes are truly an at-risk population in this area.” Id. 
at 523 (emphasis added). Studies have showed that student-athletes “average[] more 
drinks per week and engage[] in more frequent binge drinking episodes than non-
athletes.” Id. at 524. Studies also show that student-athletes are more likely to engage in 
the negative consequences of drinking, such as “impaired academic work, getting into 
trouble with the police or other authorities, being taken advantage of sexually[,] . . . have 
more sexual partners, and perpetrate more sexual violence than nonathletes.” Id. 
 254. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2. 
 255. Id. at 4. 
 256. Id. 
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student-athletes to feel less stressed or “overwhelmed” by providing in-
dependent counsel and advocacy to further their interests.257  The agent’s 
involvement can even assist the student-athlete in mature decision mak-
ing.258  Research reveals that 
where emotional and social influences on judgment are minimized 
or can be mitigated and where there are consultants [like sports 
agents] who can provide objective information about the costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be 
just as capable of mature decision making as adults.259 
Traditional principles of agency law should facilitate such counsel and 
advocacy by agents.  It recognizes that agents owe their principals, here 
student-athletes, a fiduciary duty of loyalty, the protection of their con-
fidences, competence, and the advancement of their general welfare.260  
These fiduciary principals should encourage student-athletes to fully 
communicate with and confide in their agent. 
Agents offer student-athletes a number of valuable services, includ-
ing advice about their careers and finances.261  This advice is especially 
helpful to student-athletes, many of whom are young and inexperienced 
when it comes to career and financial matters.  These important matters 
warrant student-athlete attention.  However, such matters compete for 
space in the student-athlete’s busy schedule and structured environment 
 
 257. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (noting that some student athletes feel 
overwhelmed). 
 258. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 34. 
 259. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ Ac-
cess to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 583-94 (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Adolescents Less Mature] (discussing 
the American Psychologist Association’s (APA’s) seemingly inconsistent positions regarding 
adolescent decision-making in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that abolished the 
death penalty for juveniles under the age of eighteen and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 
417 (1990), where the Court upheld a parental notification requirement with a judicial bypass 
option for minors seeking an abortion). The APA argued that an adolescent’s decision making 
was not comparable to an adult’s in Simmons while arguing in Hodgson that an adolescent’s 
decision making was comparable to an adult’s and making parental notification unnecessary 
or less compelling. The authors conclude that developmental science should “contribute to 
debates about the drawing of legal age boundaries, but caution[ed]” that it is important to 
undertake a “careful and nuanced consideration of the particular demands placed on the indi-
vidual for ‘adult-like’ maturity in different domains of functioning”—i.e., that adult-like ma-
turity by adolescents depends on the context. Id. at 593. 
 260. Darren A. Heitner, Duties of Sports Agents to Athletes and Statutory Regulation 
Thereof, 7 Dartmouth L.J. 246, 247 (2009) (explaining that upon signing a contract with an 
agent, an athlete manifests consent for the agent to act on the athlete’s behalf and subject to 
the athlete’s control, imposing fiduciary duties on the agent); see also JOHN P. SAHL, R. 
MICHAEL CASSIDY, BENJAMIN P. COOPER & MARGARET C. TARKINGTON, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN FOCUS 241 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds. 2018) (describing the attorney-
client relationship as a fiduciary one). 
 261. See supra Part III (discussing the various services and role of agents). 
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that generally leaves little time for the athlete to undertake matters be-
yond meeting their significant athletic,262 academic,263 and possible em-
ployment responsibilities.264  Devoting sufficient time to these core re-
sponsibilities becomes even more challenging for athletes who are also 
trying to develop and maintain personal relationships with peers, family, 
and others.  One psychologist reported “that compared with their non-
athlete peers, student-athletes scored significantly lower on measures of 
their educational plans, career plans, and mature relationships.”265  The 
sobering conclusion from GOALS and other sources is clear.  The 
amount of student-athlete discretionary time for understanding and en-
gaging in career and financial planning and other endeavors is very lim-
ited.  Agents potentially offer student-athletes an independent source of 
advice and assistance on these matters.  Any agent certification process 
must require up-to-date education and training in financial and career 
planning, including knowledge of alternative career choices, since the 
vast majority of student-athletes will not play professionally or for a long 
period.  The Rice Commission Report acknowledged this important 
point when it noted that “[o]nly a very small percentage of NCAA’s 
men’s basketball players make it to the NBA (around 1.2%) let alone 
have successful careers.”266  The importance of student-athletes, and oth-
ers, understanding their financial welfare is reflected in the social 
 
 262. Cal. Assemb. Hearing re S.B. 206 by the Comm. on Arts, Ent., Sports, Tourism, and 
Internet Media (2019-2020) (June 25, 2019). “University studies have found that athletes are 
spending thirty-two to forty-four hours a week on their respective sports. The time commit-
ment athletes dedicate make it practically impossible for athletes to obtain outside employ-
ment to provide for themselves or families.” Id. at 3. 
 263. NCAA GOALS, supra note 245, at 2. 
 264. NCAA Research, Results from the 2015 GOALS Study of the Student-Athlete Expe-
rience, NCAA (Jan. 2016), http://ncaa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/GOALS_convention_slidebank_jan2016_public.pdf. 
 265. Williams, supra note 253, at 7; see also Steinberg, et al., supra note 259, at 586 
(“[A]dolescents are not of equal maturity with respect to the psychosocial capacities listed by 
Justice Kennedy in Roper—capacities such as impulse control and resistance to peer influ-
ence.”). 
 266. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5; see generally Grant Sharretts, Why student athletes 
should value their education, PATRIOT (Jan. 22, 2016), 
https://jcpatriot.com/sports/2016/01/22/why-student-athletes-should-value-their-education/ 
(explaining the importance of student-athlete education finding that while only two percent of 
college athletes make it to the pros, a UNC Greensboro study found that sixty percent of 183 
student-athletes at UNC-Chapel Hill read between a fourth and eighth grade level; but see 
Sara Ganim, NCAA: It’s not our job to ensure educational quality, CNN (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:54 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/01/sport/ncaa-response-to-lawsuit/index.html (arguing 
that the NCAA took a drastically different view than its stated “student’s first, athlete’s sec-
ond” mantra when it stated in response to a UNC former athlete lawsuit that, “it has no legal 
responsibility to ensure the academic integrity of the courses offered to student-athletes at its 
member institutions.”). 
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movement promoting financial capability.267  This movement is en-
dorsed by many governmental and nongovernmental entities in the 
United States, including the President’s Advisory Council on Financial 
Capability.268  “Financial capability refers to people’s ability to manage 
and take control of their finances.”269  Financial capability is particularly 
important today with the “weakening of the government-managed eco-
nomic safety net” that shifts more responsibility to the individual for his 
or her “long-term economic security.”270  For example, in coming years, 
the government’s underfunding of social security, “the traditional retire-
ment income source,” along with company-sponsored pension programs 
“changing from mainly defined benefit programs to mainly defined con-
tribution retirement programs,” underscore the need for individuals, in-
cluding student-athletes, to be financially capable and to plan for their 
retirement.271  “These trends suggest that ordinary consumers should 
worry about their long-term economic security and start to manage their 
retirement savings in the early years,”272 including during adolescence, 
a time when student-athletes and others may be developmentally less 
capable of handling such matters.273  Some agents who have registered 
 
 267. Jing Jian Xiao, Cheng Chen & Lei Sun, Age Differences in Consumer Financial Ca-
pability, 39 INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 387, 387-94 (2015) (“The purpose of this study is to 
examine age differences in financial capability” which “is measured by five variables: objec-
tive financial literacy, subjective financial literacy, desirable financial capability, perceived 
financial capability, and a financial capability index.” Id. at 387.). 
 268. Id. at 387. 
 269. Id. (citing Mark Taylor, Measuring Financial Capability and its Determinants Using 
Survey Data, 102 SOC. INDICATORS RES., 297 (2011)). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. See RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (discussing the challenge of retirement from a 
professional athlete’s perspective; the same athlete concerns are arguably applicable to stu-
dent-athletes in college or high school). 
Given that most professional athletes have a short career span, an area of vital con-
cern is the athlete’s post-career transition. An NFLPA survey of former football 
players revealed that job hopping, emotional and financial problems, and lingering 
injuries replace the NFL glamour and glory for many players. One former Wash-
ington Redskins player noted, ‘Unless, you are a superstar with tons of money, you 
go from a high income . . . to the real world of knocking doors looking for a job.’  
 Id. at 16. 
 272. Xiao, supra note 267, at 387; see RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (“The players who 
make the smoothest transition are typically those who began early. Hockey Hall of Famer 
Tony Esposito believes that the toughest time for an athlete is quitting. ‘From day one an 
agent should help a player plan for retirement.’ ” ). 
 273. See Jennifer J. Valentine & Deborah J. Taub, Responding to the Developmental 
Needs of Student Athletes, 2 J. COLL. COUNSELING 164 (1999); see generally Mark Vermil-
lion, Division I Student Athletes’ Perceptions: How Well Does the Athletic Department Pro-
mote Student Athlete Development in an Urban-Serving University?, 25 Metro. U. J. 79 
(2014), https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/muj/article/view/20563 (explaining the factors 
that Division I student-athletes face that affect development and the effectiveness of student-
development initiatives). 
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with a professional athletes union, such as the National Football League 
Players Association (NFLPA), have received some financial training or 
materials as part of the union’s certification process.274 
Agents can be especially helpful in educating student-athletes about 
their financial situation.  In addition to operating a daily agent business, 
the agent’s success is dependent, in large part, on keeping abreast of re-
cent developments in the sports industries.275  These industries are inter-
connected to other industries, such as lending institutions, food and bev-
erage manufacturers, and governmental actors, such as the state or local 
tax authorities.  The agent may have some knowledge of these related 
industries that he or she can use to help a student-athlete’s financial plan-
ning.  Financial education or literacy has the “potential to . . . change 
consumer financial behaviors . . . [and] improve financial well-being.”276 
Agents can also be a valuable source of information and assistance 
in helping student-athletes to understand and plan their career choices.277  
The importance of such information to athletes, in general, is reflected, 
in part, on at least one professional athletes union’s website sharing in-
formation concerning possible off-season employment opportunities.278  
Agents working in the sports field should have information and insights 
about future career opportunities for a particular athlete.  Agents, espe-
cially seasoned agents, may have employment leads and a network of 
contacts in the sports world to help advance a student-athlete’s career 
aspirations.279 
The agent constitutes an independent source for such information 
and perspective and is less susceptible to the potentially competing 
 
 274. See also NFLPA, REGULATIONS AND CODE OF CONDUCT: GOVERNING REGISTERED 
PLAYER FINANCIAL ADVISORS (2017), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/De-
fault/NFLPA/FinancialAdvisors/Final%20Financial%20Advisors%20Regs%20October%20
24.pdf. 
 275. See Jan Stiglitz, A Modest Proposal: Agent Deregulation, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 361, 
364-65 (1997) (emphasizing the value of agents by contending that only two groups of per-
sons, agents and people who work for NFL teams, are sufficiently aware of recent league 
developments and otherwise possess the requisite expertise to analyze the NFL draft and de-
termine whether or not a student athlete should enter the professional draft). 
 276. Xiao, supra note 267, at 387. 
 277. See RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (“Agents often serve a valuable role as counselor. 
They help their clients adjust to personal and professional problems. ‘My agent was a good 
friend and a steadying influence on me,’ Rudy Tomjanovich said, commenting on his 13-year 
NBA career. ‘You need that in a league where the emotions run from red hot to ice cold.’ ” ). 
 278. NFLPA, CAREER DEVELOPMENT, https://nflpa.com/active-players/career-develop-
ment (last visited Aug. 30, 2020). 
 279. See RUXIN, supra note 123, at 17 (“[A] good agent does more than help a player 
convert his athletic skills into financial security. He protects the player’s rights, prepares the 
player for a second career, and, as a former baseball executive said ‘keeps the player in a 
frame of mind where he can perform best for himself and his team.’ ” ). 
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interests of the student-athlete’s institution, especially the interests of 
some of its key constituents, such as the athletic director and coaches.  
For example, the student-athlete’s basketball coach may desire the ath-
lete’s return to keep his roster set for the following season.  The coach’s 
self-interest in a set roster could potentially influence the coach’s advice 
about entering the draft or seeking a new career to the detriment of the 
student-client’s interests.  Some coaches may believe that they can filter 
out any potential or actual conflicting interests when advising the athlete 
about important decisions, such as remaining on the school’s team.  Yet 
their vested institutional and personal interests in having the student re-
turn to play for another season creates a risk that a coach may uncon-
sciously shape his or her advice.280  A coach has a strong self-interest in 
fielding a winning team and in maintaining a familiar and comfortable 
coaching environment with a set roster.  In addition to the risk of a 
coach’s unconscious bias, there is another broader concern about the 
self-interest of coaches.  Their self-interest may lead them to try to min-
imize any potential third-party influence by agents on the student-ath-
letes.  In effect, coaches may seek to construct an informational silo 
around student-athletes making access to agents, a source of information 
and advice untethered to the athlete’s university, even more important in 
broadening the student-athlete’s context for decision-making.  It is im-
portant to remember that coaches occupy a central and powerful role in 
the lives of their student-athletes, perhaps best underscored by the 
coach’s determination of which athletes get playing time.  This makes it 
very difficult for a student-athlete to legitimately question a coach’s ac-
tions and having access to an agent may offer the student-athlete a safer 
alternative for expressing concerns.  The agent can then act as conven-
ient foil for the athlete by raising these same concerns with the coach. 
Today, in our media-driven society, it is important for student-ath-
letes to have a strong and positive public image.  Such an image is good 
for a student-athlete’s self-esteem and for the possibility of generating 
additional revenue separate from his or her athletic performances.  Alt-
hough there may not be much value in a student-athlete’s image at the 
beginning of his or her college career, “[t]he building of an image starts 
 
 280. There is much scholarship in recent years about the risks associated with unconscious 
bias. Some of this literature supports the concern that coaches may not appreciate that their 
advice and efforts on behalf of the student-athlete is not merely altruistic but instead biased 
or motivated by some other reason, such as the coach’s interest in retaining employment or 
transferring to a better position. See, e.g., Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of 
Whiteness, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1259, 1289-91 (2004). 
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early”281 and “[a]gents play a vital role in helping shape and protect their 
clients’ interests.”282  Agents and their student-athlete clients will want 
to devote considerable time to developing a strategy for cultivating and 
promoting the athlete’s image.283  For example, student-athletes, like 
their pro-counterparts, can create a fan following on Twitter and other 
social media platforms that might translate into future value; for exam-
ple, when the athlete turns professional and agrees to participate in an 
advertising campaign. 
A positive image can be developed, “promot[ed] and preserv[ed]” 
by “orchestrating or suppressing publicly reported personal actions.”284  
For a recent example, consider the New Orleans Saints quarterback, 
Drew Brees, and his wife, who donated five million dollars to help Lou-
isiana’s citizens contend with the effects of the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19).  This generous donation was nationally reported and 
warmly received by the public, given the grave threat posed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.285  This gesture likely enhanced Brees’ public 
standing with the Saints franchise, his teammates, the NFL, and the res-
idents of Louisiana and elsewhere.  The value of a future Drew Brees 
product endorsement has likely increased because of this charitable pub-
lic act and its subsequent coverage by the media.286  Agents and 
 
 281. Shane T. Johnson, An Athlete’s Primer - Image Development, Protection and Preser-
vation, 15 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3 (1997); see Kristi Dosh, How Student Athletes Can Prepare to 
Become Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/ar-
ticle/343870 (“[S]tudent athletes have to focus on building their channels [or methods for 
branding] as early as possible.”); see also Kristi Dosh, Nebraska First To Launch Program 
To Help Student Athletes Maximize The Value Of Their Individual Brands, FORBES (Mar. 10, 
2020, 11:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2020/03/10/nebraska-first-to-
launch-program-to-help-student-athletes-maximize-the-value-of-their-individual-
brands/#53efa5cb6303 (reporting that the University of Nebraska is partnering with Open-
dorse, a social publishing platform, to develop student-athlete brands with one expert noting 
that social media provides the “most immediate and significant opportunity for name, image 
and likeness monetization for student-athletes.”). 
 282. RUXIN, supra note 123, at 15; see Johnson, supra note 281, at 5-6 (discussing the 
different types of agency services available to an athlete). 
 283. Johnson, supra note 281, at 4. Agents will also want to protect the student-athlete’s 
image, for example, by making sure there are no unauthorized uses of the athlete’s image. 
However, the agent’s efforts during the student-athlete phase of one’s athletic career will be 
mostly devoted to cultivating and promoting the athlete’s image rather than taking legal or 
other action to protect the image. Id. 
 284. Id. at 3. 
 285. Michael Middlehurst-Schwartz, Saints QB Drew Brees to donate $5 Million in Lou-
isiana coronavirus relief effort, USA TODAY (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:35 PM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/sports/nfl/saints/2020/03/26/drew-brees-donate-coronavirus-relief-louisiana-
new-orleans-saints/2916543001/. 
 286. See Gary Phillips, Drew Brees And His Wife Pledge $5 Million To Help Louisiana 
Battle Coronavirus Outbreak, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/garyphillips/2020/03/26/drew-brees-wife-brittany-pledge-5-
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student-athletes will want to be careful when image building so as not to 
violate any NCAA rules “endanger[ing] a scholarship or the ability to 
compete in sanctioned competitions.”287  Nevertheless, college athletes 
should develop a plan for building an image that can be monetized after 
the student-athlete exits the college ranks.  The agent and student-athlete 
might appoint an advisory committee to advise them about the right strat-
egy for building and cultivating an image.  “With proper planning, [the 
student-athlete’s agent and other] advisors can help craft and protect a 
marketable image that will still have value after the athlete retires from 
the arena.”288  As with financial and career counseling, agents offer stu-
dent-athletes a valuable source of independent advice and support in de-
veloping an image.  Agents’ attention to these important matters prom-
ises to enhance student-athlete welfare by reducing some of the 
significant stress from their core responsibilities of athletics, academics, 
and a possible job.  This is an important benefit that should be available 
to all student-athletes. 
VII. THE TIME IS RIPE TO REPLACE THE “NO AGENT” RULE—SOME 
THOUGHTS FOR A “MODIFIED AGENT” RULE 
The NCAA’s “Basic Purpose” in regulating intercollegiate amateur 
athletics289 is to govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable, and sports-
manlike manner, and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher ed-
ucation so that the educational experience of the student-athlete is 
 
million-to-help-louisiana-battle-coronavirus-outbreak-hurricane-katrina/#39c216391277. 
For an infamous example of publicity with more mixed results consider the notorious incident 
involving figure skaters Tonya Harding and Nancy Kerrigan who were competitors, see John-
son, supra note 281, at 3 (noting how “Tonya Harding gained notoriety of the undesirable 
type” by conspiring to injure Kerrigan so that Harding would win the skating championship). 
 287. Johnson, supra note 281, at 5. 
 288. See id. at 7 (highlighting the importance of monetizing one’s image for retirement 
purposes by noting that Michael Jordan earned $44 million in 1995—“$3.9 million in salary 
and $40 million in endorsements” and contrasting that with the situation of the boxer, Mike 
Tyson, who earned $40 million in prize money and no money from endorsements.”); see also 
Akiko Arai, Yong Jae Ko & Stephen Ross, Branding Athletes: Exploration and Conceptual-
ization of Athlete Brand Image, 17 SPORTS MGMT. REV. 97 (2014) (reporting that “managing 
brands for athletes is becoming an essential task for agents” and emphasizing this point by 
noting that “IMG, the world’s largest sports agency, announced their mission statement as 
‘[t]oday, we help hundreds of elite athlete, coaches, industry executives and prestigious sports 
organizations maximize their earnings potential and build strong personal brands.’ ” ). 
 289. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1. The NCAA also mandates that student-
athletes be amateurs and that their conduct not cross the line of demarcation between amateurs 
and professionals. Id. § 1.3.1 (stating that a core purpose of the NCAA is to “maintain inter-
collegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral 
part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between inter-
collegiate athletics and professional sports”) (emphasis added). 
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paramount.290  The Basic Purpose further provides that the integration of 
intercollegiate athletics into higher education and a focus on the student-
athlete’s academic interest will help “to retain a clear line of demarcation 
between intercollegiate [or amateur] athletics and professional 
sports.”291  Thus, the NCAA’s “Basic Purpose” provision reflects the 
NCAA’s key principle of amateurism.292  This principle should not be 
viewed as mutually exclusive from a policy that would permit student-
athletes to contract with sports agents.  An agent’s presence in a student-
athlete’s life does not automatically transform his or her participation in 
amateur collegiate competition into professional sports.293  Even with the 
assistance of a sports agent, the student-athlete remains bound by a myr-
iad of other NCAA non-agent rules, such as the NCAA’s twenty-hour 
rule that caps the amount of weekly practice time.294  Instead, the NCAA 
should view the agent’s role as an aid in helping to maximize the student-
athlete’s “educational experience.”295 
The NCAA should replace the No Agent Rule with a MAR.296  A 
MAR approach to NCAA reform, like the Rice Commission’s 
 
 290. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1; see Glenn M. Wong, Warren Zola & Chris 
Deubert, Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to Student-Athletes in a Complicated Le-
gal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 553, 557 (2011); Reid, supra 
note 159, at 78. 
 291. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1. 
 292. Id. §§ 1.3.1, 2.9. 
 293. See Matthew Stross, The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring Amateurism, 2 MISS. 
SPORTS L. REV. 167, 179  (2012) (contending that “merely allowing legal [and arguably agent] 
representation during the course of contract negotiations will not destroy the principles of 
amateurism[;]” emphasizing that “[c]ollegiate sports and professional sports remain different 
in many aspects,” id. at 179; acknowledging that the NCAA has often blurred the lines of 
demarcation between amateur and professional sports, id. at 180-83; and noting that while the 
NCAA bylaws prohibit the use of agents, “the NCAA allows students to perform essentially 
the same actions” [i.e., negotiate contracts with professional sports organizations] on their 
own or without expert assistance and still retain their amateur status, id. at 181). 
 294. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA’s twenty-hour 
rule); see also Stross, supra note 293, at 185, 191 (allowing student-athletes to have represen-
tation during contract negotiations “does no more to destroy the separation between amateur-
ism and professionalism than the Professional Sports Counseling Panel[,] [a three-person 
panel, that an NCAA member school may have to educate and even negotiate with a profes-
sional sports organization on behalf of an athlete] currently does.”). 
 295. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.3.1; see also William W. Berry III, Educat-
ing Athletes Re-Envisioning the Student-Athlete Model, 81 TENN. L. REV. 795, 803-04, 825-
26 (2014) (examining the NCAA’s amateurism principle and its intersection with the com-
mercial realties of intercollegiate football and basketball and suggesting, in part, that six-year 
scholarships and an academic in-season load reduction to three credits as “improving the abil-
ity of student-athletes to be students” by allowing them more time for a “robust” educational 
experience). 
 296. MAR stands for Modified Agent Rule. See supra note 95 (noting the NCAA adopted 
the Rice Commission’s recommendation to modify the NCAA’s No Agent Rule and permit 
agents for elite basketball players). 
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recommendations, recognizes and attempts to preserve the NCAA’s 
overriding commitment to a policy of amateurism.  Although a complete 
and detailed description of a MAR is beyond the scope of this article, 
any NCAA MAR should ideally embrace the following key elements. 
First, and most importantly, a MAR should permit all college stu-
dent-athletes, irrespective of their division or conference affiliation, to 
enter into a written agreement with a NCAA-certified “agent for the pur-
pose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that 
sport.”297  Allowing every student-athlete to engage the services of an 
agent would facilitate the integration of athletics into higher education 
by allowing the student-athlete to devote more time to academics, ath-
letics, and perhaps employment. 298  Some student-athletes may not be 
interested in agent representation, and some agents may not have an in-
terest in representing athletes whose professional or commercial pro-
spects are minimal.299  The intensely competitive marketplace to play 
 
 297. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.3.1. The quoted language in the text is from 
the current NCAA “no agent” rule that forbids any student-athlete from entering into any oral 
or written agreement for the purposes of marketing the athlete’s athletic ability. The MAR 
breaks with this longstanding “no agent” tradition by permitting such agreements, but only in 
writing; memorializing and impressing upon the agent and the student-athlete the seriousness 
of their services agreement. The current NCAA’s “no agent” rule for enrolled elite basketball 
players or prospective players requires the student athlete to terminate the written sports agent 
agreement “before full-time enrollment in the ensuing academic term” if the student-athlete 
does not sign a contract with a professional team. See id. § 12.3.1.2.5. The failure to terminate 
the sports agent agreement renders the athlete ineligible for NCAA competition. A MAR 
should not require the termination of the sports agent agreement and instead should permit an 
on-going relationship between the agent and the student-athlete in which the agent provides 
important counseling benefits to the student, for example, providing financial and career plan-
ning advice among other matters. Unlike the current NCAA rules, a MAR would permit an 
athlete to enter a sports agent agreement with an agent for representation in future professional 
sports negotiations. Contra id. § 12.3.1.3. Also, any MAR should continue the new NCAA 
rule exempting a “prospective or enrolled student-athlete [from having] to compensate an 
NCAA-certified agent for his or her services.” Id. § 12.3.1.2.6. Following the student’s com-
pletion of his or her eligibility for a sport, the agent should be entitled to the reasonable cost 
of his or her post-eligibility services and related expenses. 
 298. See supra Part V (discussing how agents can help student-athletes find more time to 
focus on these core responsibilities). See also Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations 
Related to the Use of Agents in the Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best 
of Interest of the Amateur Athletics?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215 (2005)); see also Edel-
man, supra note 95, at 215 (rejecting the NCAA’s claim that its no-agent rule’s goal is to 
protect student-athletes because the rule exposes them to significant harm by prohibiting them 
from having an agent or competent representation to deal with professional sports organiza-
tions and the complex business and legal issues that the surround the world of professional 
sports, id. at 215-16). 
 299. An agent’s interest in representing a certain student-athlete may extend beyond the 
mere possibility of negotiating a future professional sports contract. For example, a student 
athlete may have little prospect of playing for a professional sports team but nevertheless 
possesses other market or commercial value. The athlete may be able to work for a team’s 
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professional sports will help determine which student-athletes are likely 
to have an agent’s services. 
As the Rice Commission highlighted, the NCAA “must appoint a 
Vice-President level executive to develop meaningful standards for 
NCAA certification and administer the program” to protect student-ath-
letes from bad agents.300  This Rice Commission mandate for vice-pres-
ident executive level support for an agent certification program should 
be an essential part of any future MAR, signaling the importance of the 
MAR to agents and other NCAA stakeholders, such as student-athletes 
and coaches.  In addition, the NCAA should adopt some provisions of 
the RUAAA, especially its detailed registration provisions.301 
The NCAA must be committed to enforcing the MAR against mis-
creant agents.  Adequate resources and a willingness to enforce the MAR 
is critical to having a viable agent regulatory regime.302  The NCAA’s 
agent certification department should keep in close contact with its state 
and federal counterparts to make sure miscreant agents appearing before 
the NCAA will not continue similar misdeeds at the professional level.  
Close contact with state and federal agent regulatory bodies also could 
alert the NCAA to agent misconduct at the professional level, enabling 
the NCAA to take preemptive action against bad agents to protect stu-
dent-athletes. 
 
business or public relations office or act in a television commercial unrelated to sports, such 
as promoting heath club memberships or selling clothes. 
 300. RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
 301. RUAAA, supra note 127, § 4 (Athlete Agent: Registration Required: Void.) and § 5 
(Registration As Athlete Agent: Application Requirements: Reciprocal Registration.). Other 
RUAAA provisions that warrant serious consideration for a MAR include section 10, which 
requires an agency contract signed by all parties to include “a description of the services to be 
provided to the athlete . . . the amount and method of calculating consideration to be paid by 
the student athlete for the [agent’s] services . . . .”, id. § 10; section 14 was recently amended 
in July 2019 to comport with the Rice Commission’s recommendations that were imple-
mented by the NCAA in August 2018, id. §14; and section 16, which offers a student-athlete 
and his or her educational institution the right to sue the athlete agent for damages stemming 
from a RUAAA violation and notes that any RUAAA violation constitutes an unfair trade or 
deceptive practice, implicating possible federal oversight under SPARTA, id. § 16. See 
RUAAA, supra note 127; see also supra Part III Section B (discussing SPARTA and how 
violations of it are treated as unfair trade practices). 
 302. See RICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 (“[T]he Commission heard from many com-
menters who identified both the NCAA’s enforcement process and the substance of the 
NCAA’s rules as inadequate to deal with the challenges presented by Division I Men’s Bas-
ketball.”). A potential funding source for the enforcement of a MAR could come from the 
registration fees paid by sports agents to the NCAA. A similar funding model exists in some 
states where a portion of the lawyer registration or license fees are directed to lawyer regula-
tion. See SAHL, supra note 260, at 45. Additional funding sources would likely be necessary 
to cover the cost of the NCAA’s regulation of sports agents. 
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The NCAA’s “Vice-President level executive” for agent certifica-
tion should attempt to separate the functions of registration, investiga-
tion, prosecution, and adjudication within the NCAA certification office 
in hope of avoiding any conflicts of interest and due process concerns.303  
For example, an NCAA employee who encountered difficulties with an 
applicant for certification should not subsequently be involved in inves-
tigating or possibly disciplining that same applicant.  This separation of 
functions, involving different NCAA personnel, should help foster neu-
tral fact finding and an independence of judgment, thus producing fairer 
determinations.  Separating these regulatory functions should also reas-
sure agent-respondents that due process is part of the NCAA agent dis-
ciplinary process.304 
It is important that agents not be viewed as adversaries but rather as 
partners of the NCAA and any other state or federal regulatory effort to 
protect and enhance student-athlete interests.  As partners with the 
NCAA, a MAR should require agents who know of another agent’s mis-
conduct to report that agent to the NCAA’s agent certification depart-
ment and/or an appropriate college’s NCAA compliance office.  A sim-
ilar self-reporting requirement model exists in the legal profession where 
lawyers are required to report a fellow lawyer’s misconduct to the ap-
propriate disciplinary authority.305  The failure of lawyers to honor the 
reporting requirement constitutes professional misconduct and subjects 
them to discipline, including suspension or disbarment.306  Adoption of 
a similar reporting requirement for agents should help incentivize their 
full compliance with a MAR. 
 
 303. See LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32529, THE NCAA AND 
DUE PROCESS: LEGAL ISSUES (2004). A congressional research report was conducted in 2004 
reviewing and analyzing the NCAA v. Tarkanian and NCAA v. Miller decisions determining 
that the NCAA’s actions to investigate and enforce its rules is beyond state regulation. Id. 
 304. See Aidan Middlemiss McCormack, Seeking Procedural Due Process in NCAA In-
fractions Procedures: States Take Action, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 261 (1992). See also Due 
Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 106 (2004). 
 305. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). “Reporting Profes-
sional Misconduct Conduct, (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Misconduct that raises a substantial question as to that 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the 
appropriate professional authority.” Id. at r. 8.3. Thus, a sports agent’s duty to report another 
agent under the ABA approach is triggered only when the agent knows of another’s miscon-
duct that raises a “substantial question” about that lawyer’s fitness to practice. That is a less 
onerous standard than some states that require reporting whenever another lawyer’s conduct 
raises “a question”—something less than a substantial question—about that agent’s ability to 
act as a fiduciary for a student-athlete. See OHIO RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (imposing 
a duty to report when there is “a question” of another lawyer’s fitness to practice). See also 
SAHL, supra note 260, at 71 (discussing a lawyer’s duty to report misconduct). 
 306. See SAHL, supra note 260, at 61, 71. 
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Although a MAR would permit all student-athletes to have access 
to an agent’s services, it should still maintain some restrictions on that 
relationship.307  For example, the current prohibition on agents providing 
student-athletes payment or other benefits to represent them should be 
maintained, as such payments are contrary to the NCAA’s principle of 
amateurism.308  As currently the case for only Division I elite basketball 
players, a MAR should permit agents to pay athletes’ and their families’ 
reasonable expenses related to the agent selection process.  Such ex-
penses would include travel, housing, food, and related costs.  The 
NCAA, along with individual colleges and the state office charged with 
overseeing agents, should closely monitor the payment of such expenses 
to avoid opening a door for abuse.  Although there is always some risk 
that rogue agents will engage in abusive conduct regarding the reim-
bursement of expenses related to the selection of agents or in some other 
regard, this risk and others are ultimately outweighed by the potential 
benefits to student-athletes having agent representation, including agent 
counseling, experience, moral support, and advocacy. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Sports are an important thread in our social fabric, as poignantly 
illustrated by the widespread disappointment in the cessation of profes-
sional and college sports due to the COVID-19 pandemic.309  Some fans 
have struggled to adapt to a life without sporting competitions, not only 
in the United States, but globally.310  When sports resume, it will 
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NCAA, including by requiring NCAA certification and registration with schools and by re-
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 308. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.3.1.4 (barring benefits based on athletic 
skills from prospective sports agents to student athletes, their family members or friends). 
 309. See Ryan Lewis, MLB, MLBPA reach agreement on coronavirus shutdown, accord-
ing to reports, AKRON BEACON J. (Mar. 27, 2020, 6:02 PM), https://www.beaconjour-
nal.com/sports/20200327/mlb-mlbpa-reach-agreement-on-coronavirus-shutdown-according-
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a wide range of issues involving the work stoppage forced by the coronavirus outbreak); see 
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 310. See Peter Landers & Rachel Bachman, Japan, IOC Agree to Postpone 2020 Tokyo 
Olympics by About One Year, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2020, 5:57 PM), 
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hopefully usher in a new era where the NCAA continues its long, albeit 
flawed, tradition of amateurism with a renewed spirit to protect the in-
terests of student-athletes by eliminating the No Agent Rule and replac-
ing it with a MAR.311 
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